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ABSTRACT
The increasing trends of integrated and concentrated broiler production results in a
serious threat to environment through excessive litter production and lack of its proper disposal.
Production concentration in limited area is a major source of surface as well as ground water
pollution. Nonpoint source pollution from broiler litter applied on land remains a major concern
in Louisiana and elsewhere in Southeastern USA. This study examines alternative approaches to
reduce pollution originating from broiler production. First, I evaluate why some producers adopt
BMP faster than others and what kind of factors affect the time to adoption decision. The
duration model is employed to allow the censored observation while evaluating the impact of
farm and individual specific characteristics on time to adoption decision. The information and
awareness about the BMPs and the negative effects of broiler production on water-bodies are
found to be the main factors to encourage the adoptions. Larger farmers are also the early
adopters of BMPs.
The existing literature finds voluntary BMP implementation serves only as
complementary-instrument to economic-incentive-based approaches. Therefore, the option of
economic-incentive based approach to mitigate water pollution becomes crucial. I evaluate the
factors associated with the incentive level that motivates broiler producers to either terminate the
production practices or pay pollution abatement costs so as to reduce pollutant entering water
resources. I attempt to answers the question of “what is the minimum amount that a broiler
producer is willing to accept to forgo the production practice so as to reduce pollution
generation”. It is found that broiler producers are willing to terminate production only if the
government payment is very high as compared to the profit from the production. However, the
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producer’s willingness to pay pollution abatement tax is comparatively small, if they were to pay
to mitigate the water pollution at their current production technology.

x

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Rapid growth on broiler production and its spatial concentration have been a serious issue
due to the negative environmental consequences originating from excessive litter production
(Glover, 1996; Wastenberger and Dedson, 1995). The concentration of broiler production
exacerbates the level of litter1 application in the broiler production areas (Glover, 1996). Broiler
litter, when applied on land improperly and in excessive amounts2, causes higher nutrients
concentration in soil which eventually results in leaching and surface runoff into the waterbodies (Kingery et al., 1994). In addition, the lack of perfectly operating litter markets results in
a repetitive application exacerbating the nutrient buildup, runoff, and leaching (Sharpley et al.,
2004) – causing externalities to other inhabitants in the region.
Excess nitrogen may leach into ground water causing risk to human health, or runoff to
the coastal waters causing hypoxia, whereas the phosphorus (the main nutrient pollutant from
broiler litter) runs off along with the sediments from crops and pasture lands, adding on to the
water contamination and eutrophication. These adverse environmental effects are largely
attributed to the litter application in excess of the nutrient requirement of crops and pastures,
and/or trying to dispose the byproduct of chicken production (Glover, 1996).
These externalities prevent a socially optimal use of the water resources among users
posing negative effects on human health as well as to the ecosystem. The governmental and
public concern over the potential health effects has forced the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (US EPA) and state agencies to intensify the regulatory approaches to reduce

1

Broiler litter represents the mixture of broiler excreta, bedding material and waste feed removed from the
production units during the cleaning process.
2
Excessive litter application is defined as an application that provides nutrients (Nitrogen and Phosphorous) greater
than the crop requirement.
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nutrient pollution. In fact, the broiler industry is under the threat of environmental regulation
because of the increased level of nutrient buildup and run off which originates from excessive
and repetitive litter application (MacDonald, 2008).
Conceptually, the externality problem can be solved by using price mechanisms, control
instruments or the pollution standards and restricting the use of pollution-generating inputs in the
production process. The problem can also be solved by implementing management practices
which reduces the nutrients amount from reaching the water-bodies. In addition, the concept of
production termination has been an alternative strategy to reduce agriculture related pollution, in
recent years (Lambert, et al., 2007; Reichelderfer and Boggess, 1988).
Governmental incentive payments are provided in order to motivate producers to
voluntarily modify their production practices to meet pollution-reduction goals. Further, the
section 319 of the Clean Water Act focused on voluntary adoption of best management practices
(BMPs) to reduce agriculture related non-point source pollution. The implementation of BMPs
requires farmers’ investment although the farmers fail to experience full benefits out of their
investments. Such fact affects the BMPs adoptions negatively, resulting in slow rate of BMPs
adoption among farmers (Gillespie et al. 2008). The first section of this dissertation evaluates the
underlying factors hindering the voluntary implementation of BMPs.
The failure to encourage producers from implementing BMPs generates a concern that
the voluntary effort may fail to meet the desired water pollution reduction goal. The fear of
failure to mitigate existing agricultural water pollution through voluntary BMP adoptions is also
fueled by the current environmental conservation programs being economically inefficient
(Babcock, 1995). In addition, the existing literature argues that the voluntary effort fails to
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generate desired level of pollution reduction if not combined with other complementary
governmental regulation (Lyon and Maxwell, 2002).
Then, the option of terminating (partially/fully) the production program to reduce water
pollution emerges as a potential alternative to control agricultural water pollution. However, the
question remains on whether the farmers are willing to terminate the production process to
comply with water pollution regulation. On the other hand, if the producers are not regulated/not
charged for the pollution they generate, the non-regulated operations continue contributing
significantly to the water contamination. Hence, the second section seeks to explore the notion of
incorporating polluters on pollution reduction processes.
Thus in this dissertation, three measures of mitigating nutrient pollution originating from
broiler industries are explored. It covers the concept of bringing the polluters on pollution
reduction process either through voluntary implementation of BMPs or through providing
economic incentives and disincentives to the producers. Farmer’s willingness to maintain water
quality through the manipulation of broiler numbers is evaluated by assessing the level of
incentive level that the farmer desires to receive, if producer were to cooperate with pollution
reduction program. In addition, the concept of charging pollution abatement cost to force the
producers to pay for pollution control measures is also examined in this dissertation. Thus the
key concept of this dissertation lies on the fact that the implementation of corrective mechanisms
for nutrient pollution depends on the producers’ response behavior toward mitigating generation
of the nutrient pollutant.
I. LOUISIANA BROILER PRODUCTION
According to Louisiana Agricultural Summary, there were 468 broiler producers in
Louisiana in 2006 (Louisiana Agricultural summary, 2006). The number of producers has
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decreased from 579 in 2002, but the production has not decreased (Louisiana Agricultural
summary, 2003). The numbers suggest the concentration of broiler litter production or the
concentration of nutrient production has increased in years between 2002 and 2006. The absence
of a well functioning litter market and cost-efficient transportation system has forced broiler
producers to dispose excess litter on nearby crops and pasture lands.
Broiler production in Louisiana is clustered in relatively small, localized areas generating
a higher concentration of broiler litter in a few counties of northern Louisiana. Essentially, all
broiler production in Louisiana is vertically integrated and thus operated under contract. In fact,
production through contractual arrangements provides benefits to the producers such as reduced
market risk, production reduction responsibilities, lower operating capital requirements, and
relatively reliable and predictable incomes (Vest and Lacy, 1996). Contract based production
processes also result in rapid technology adoption, improved production efficiency, as well as
easy access to capital (Vukina, 2001). However, contract-based production leaves narrow margin
for profit and full responsibility of litter management to broiler producers.
The vertical integration of broiler production includes integration from hatcheries through
feed mills and processing plants. However, broiler production operations require substantial
investments on litter management which becomes the responsibility of the broiler producers.
Thus, the producers, not the contractors, face the responsibility of complying with the
governmental regulations and restrictions regarding environmental issues associated with broiler
production.
More specifically, the producers bear the burden of complying to government regulations
associated with the impact of litter on water quality – increasing their cost of production.
Furthermore, the producers are awarded or punished based on their production performances. For
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example, the producers producing more pounds on lower costs and/or having a lower mortality
rate are paid higher as compared to other growers (Vukina, 2001; Vest and Lacy, 1999), which
leaves limited or negative economic incentive to broiler producers for litter management.
Hence, the producers not only have to invest in management practices that lower the
nutrient production but also are punished by the integrators for increased production costs.
Therefore, the pressure for the broiler producers comes from both sectors -- the government and
the contractors, forcing the producers to seek for a low cost litter management option so that they
can stay in the business.
II.

RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

The Environmental Protection Agency’s National Water Quality Inventory of year 2000
reported that more than 41% of Louisiana’s water-bodies either partially or fully fail to support
the designated use (EPA, 2000)3. In particular, out of 9,455 miles of streams and rivers surveyed,
only 52% of surveyed miles support the designated water quality goal. More than 11% of rivers
and streams do not support the designated use and 37% only partially support water quality
standards (EPA, 2000).
Similarly, out of 664,124 acres of surveyed lakes in Louisiana, only 57% fully support
their designated water quality standard. More than 5% of the lakes surveyed fail to support their
designated use and 15% of the lakes partially support their required characteristics. Moreover,
only 10% of surveyed wetlands fully meet the criteria for its designated use (EPA, 2000).
In Louisiana, water-bodies within the western parts of the Ouachita River Basin and the
eastern parts of the Red River Basin partially meet their designated use or are largely threatened

3

Environmental Protection Agency. Louisiana waters
http://www.cleanwaternetwork.org/docs/publications/factsheets/states/la.pdf
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by the nutrients flow produced by broiler operations and pastureland runoff4. Large scale broiler
productions concentrated in the northern parishes of Louisiana are responsible for contributing
the significant amounts of phosphorus and nitrogen in nearby water-bodies5.
In addition, the lack of a fully functioning litter market has caused an excessive amount
of litter application on crops and pasture lands. The excessive nutrient application thus
accelerates both the accumulation and surface flow of nutrients in the watersheds surrounding
the broiler production region in northern Louisiana. It is well recognized that the improper and
excessive litter application results in increased nutrient leaching and surface runoff causing water
contamination (Kingery et al. 1994). However, due to the market driven nature of broiler
industry and contract based production, the problem of excess litter has been in the shadows
among the producers.
EPA noted that the nutrient runoff from land application of livestock manure or poultry
litter is a major source of pollution that is discharged into the surface waters (EPA, 2000). The
USDA Natural Resource Conservation Service in consort with the US EPA has recommended a
voluntary implementation of the BMPs. These practices if implemented decrease the generation
and transportation of nutrient pollution into the water-bodies6. However, those changes on
farming operations – to meet nutrient standards – tend to increase production costs through
investments in nutrient management operations. Thus, changing the farming practices to comply
with stringent pollution standards is likely to decrease producers’ profits through increased
production costs (Dupraz et al., 2003). These added production costs and associated profit loss
have been blamed for a slow rate of BMPs adoptions (Houston and Sun, 2000). Since a reduction
4

http://nonpoint.deq.louisiana.gov/wqa/poultry.htm
http://nonpoint.deq.louisiana.gov/wqa/poultry.htm
6
Environmental Issues Facing the Louisiana Poultry Industry: Magazine: Poultry Waste Management accessed from
http://www.lsuagcenter.com/MCMS/RelatedFiles/{95071472-8B1F-40D9-8162404692A70A48}/PoultryEnvironmentalConcerns.pdf
5
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in producers’ profits has been recognized as a major factor in hindering the adoption of
environmentally friendly practices (such as BMP), there is a need to identify alternative
measures of pollution reductions.
In addition, after a thorough literature survey of voluntary practices in the United States
and Europe, Lyon and Maxwell (2002) emphasized that voluntary implementation of
environmentally friendly production practices are complementary to the environmental
regulation and/or standard, not the substitute. Therefore, only the voluntary BMPs adoptions may
not suffice to achieve pollution reduction as desired. The notion of a production termination and
pollution tax along with voluntary BMPs seems to be a potential combination to reduce nutrient
build up and runoff.
Production termination, either partially or fully, is not in the producers’ own interest but
it is inspired by the threat of environmental regulation. Therefore, the producers require
sufficient incentives to recover losses associated with the termination of their production process.
Assigning the level of incentive payment revolves around the notion of farmers’ willingness to
participate in pollution reduction programs or proposed policies for nutrient pollution reduction.
Therefore, it is also imperative to understand how much the individuals expect to receive if they
were to comply with the proposed policies of pollution reduction. Such values in this study are
measured using contingent valuation approaches. The willingness to accept and willingness to
pay, are the two different measures to elicit farmers’ desire to participate in a pollution-reduction
program either through terminating production practices to reduce pollution generation or by
paying pollution abatement cost.
I employ willingness to pay and accept measures to evaluate broiler growers’ interest to
mitigate water pollution problem. This study assumes that the producers are aware of their
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contribution toward water pollution and the water pollution is negatively associated with human
health as well as with the ecosystem.
III.

CURRENT PROGRAMS MITIGATING AGRICULTURAL POLLUTION
The EPA and the states regulated point source pollution through the National Pollutant

Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (Clean Water Act)7. The program focused on water pollution mitigation through
regulatory actions over point sources. A considerable progress was made in restoring and
maintaining pollution flow. However, the achievement could not solve the nation’s water quality
problems. Thus, by 1987, the importance of acting over nonpoint source pollution was well
recognized.
The amended Clean Water Act, “1987 Water Quality Act” established a national level of
Nonpoint Source Management Programs to address nonpoint source pollution. The Nonpoint
Source Management Programs established by section 319 of the amended CWA started to
provide the EPA the authorities to offer grants, guidance and technical help for the state
programs to encourage implementation of nonpoint source management programs. Section 320
of amended CWA authorizes EPA to provide grants and technical guidance to state and local
governments for implementing comprehensive management plans to maintain estuaries.
The Rural Clean Water Program (RCWP) was started in 1980 to address agricultural NPS
pollution in watersheds until 1990 as an experimental effort. The program focused on
minimizing pollutant production and improving water quality while producing agricultural
commodities in the rural areas. The experimental projects included implementation of BMPs to

7

National Management Measures to Control Nonpoint Source Pollution from Agriculture, EPA 841-B-03-004, July
2003. http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/agmm/chap1.pdf retrieved on Dec 1st 2008
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mitigate agriculture related nonpoint water pollution and monitoring to examine the effects of the
BMPs.
The conservation provisions of the Farm Bill (1996) provides landowners the technical
and financial assistance to conserve, improve, and sustain the soil, water, air, and related natural
resources on their land. Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) was established by
the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (1996 Farm Act) and jointly administered
by Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) and Farm Service Agency (FSA) for the
purpose of providing incentives to the farmers and ranchers posing threats to soil and water
resources. The EQIP provides financial incentives, technical guidance and education to comply
with Federal, State, Tribal, and local environmental regulations as well as to encourage the
implementation of conservation practices that manage agricultural pollution.
The EQIP supplies cost-share (generally about 60% but up to 90% for limited resource
farmers) for an implementation of conservation practices to the grass lands, forest and crops that
reduces nutrient loading to the nearby water-bodies. Incentive payments are also extended to the
eligible farmers and ranchers implementing nutrient and manure management from their
livestock as well as crops and pasture lands. Incentive payments may be extended to three years
to encourage the implementation of the practices otherwise the farmers will not. The maximum
of ninety percent cost-share is permitted for the small and limited-resource-farmers. However, it
may not exceed $450,000 for all EQIP contracts entered during the term of the Farm Bill.
The 2008 Farm Bill increased cost incentive payments up to 90% for socially
disadvantaged farmers or ranchers in addition to limited resource producers as of 2002 Farm
Bill. Farm Bill 2008 further allowed farmers to receive advance payment up to 30% of the
amount needed to purchase materials to install and/or implement pollution reduction
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mechanisms. The funding for EQIP was $200 million in fiscal year 2002 which increased to $1.1
billion in year 2007. The amount for fiscal year 2008 is authorized to be $1.2 billion which will
again increases gradually to $1.75 billion in 20128.
IV.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The return from increased level of incentive payments for the implementation of
voluntary practices has been unconvincing. The unsatisfactory improvement in BMP adoptions
needs an examination of the factors associated with the rate of adoption over time. The first topic
of this dissertation explores the duration to implement BMPs as a tool to mitigate nutrient
generation and runoffs. More specifically, the chapter seeks to answer the question of “what are
the underlying factors associated with the slow dissemination of BMPs?”
The next issue incorporated in this dissertation examines the level of government
incentive to encourage broiler producers to implement environmentally friendly production
decisions. The dissertation answers what is the minimum amount that the broiler producers are
willing to accept to forgo their production practices in order to reduce pollution generation.
Then, the third issues addressed here is the amount that a producer is willing to pay as
pollution abatement cost. In this regard, this dissertation seeks to evaluate the maximum amount
that a broiler producer would like to pay as pollution abatement cost and keep on continuing their
existing level of production. This serves as the third alternative to mitigate the water pollution
control issue.
V.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Due to intensive market oriented broiler production and lack of economic incentive, the
broiler producers fail to accommodate pollution control efforts on their production function.

8

At a glance: Environmental Quality Incentives Program. May 2008 retrieved form
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/farmbill/2008/pdfs/EQIP_At_A_Glance_062608final.pdf on Dec 2nd, 2008
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Therefore, the primary concentration of this study remains on exploring the mechanisms to
accommodate polluters on pollution reduction efforts. In addition, the possibility of litter
transportation will also be examined. The specific objectives are to;
a) Examine time to adopt BMP. The focus remains on the factors affecting the time to BMP
adoption.
b) Evaluate broiler producer’s willingness to accept value to participate on the
environmentally benign production practices. The value is assumed to represent an
amount of incentive payment that the farmers desire to receive in order to internalize
pollution reduction efforts on their production function.
c) Examine the producer’s willingness to pay value which is assumed to represent an
amount that an individual can afford (willing to spend) to improve water quality.
VI.

OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

This dissertation examines the four viable alternatives to involve farmers on pollution
reduction programs. The core content of the research is presented on three “journal article style”
chapters. The second chapter presents the data collection approach, details on descriptive
characteristics of respondents, and simple analysis of manure surplus/deficit in broiler producing
parishes in Louisiana.
Chapter three, the first essay, evaluates the broiler producers BMP adoption decision using
a Cox proportional hazard model. The event dependence and heterogeneity among individual
farmers are accounted for using frailty and conditional frailty models.
Chapter four estimates the WTA of an individual to reduce pollution generation through
reduction in broiler production. WTA assumes to represent incentive required by an individual if
environmental regulation requires them to cut production size to reduce pollution generation.

11

Similarly, chapter five examines the farmers WTP value in the form of additional tax if they
were to continue their production practice at current size. Chapter six concludes with policy
implications of this research.
VII.
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CHAPTER TWO
SURVEY METHODOLOGY
I. SURVEY INSTRUMENT
The data used in this dissertation came from a survey where the population included all
the broiler producers in Louisiana. The questionnaire design, sampling process and the data
collection are not a part of this dissertation. Rather I used secondary data collected through
survey to understand broiler production related issues in Louisiana9. The data covers the broiler
producers in the major broiler producing parishes of Louisiana including Bienville, Claiborne,
Jackson, Lincoln, Natchitoches, Ouachita, Sabine, Union, Vernon, Webster, and Winn parishes.
Figure 2.1 shows the locations of major broiler-producing parishes in Louisiana and table 2.1
shows the characteristics of respondents.

Figure 2.1 Broiler producing parishes in Louisiana.
9

Survey design and data collection were done by Paudel (2005). Ref: Paudel, K.P. “Survey of Broiler Farmers in
Louisiana.” Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, Louisiana State University Agricultural
Center, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 2005.
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of respondents
Age of the respondents (years)
15 to 19 years
20 to 24 years
25 to 34 years

*

US Census (%)
Sample (%)
8.2
0
7.3
8.11
13.5
14.86

35 to 44 years
45 to 54 years
55 to 59 years
60 to 64 years
65 to 74 years
Educational attainment
Less than high school graduate
High school graduate (includes equivalency)
Some college, no degree
Bachelor's degree
Graduate or professional degree
Associate degree
Marital status
Never married
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Asset to liability ratio
No debt
Up to 20% of asset
21% to 40% of asset
41% to 60% of asset
Greater than 60% of asset
Ownership of broiler farm
Individual ownership
Family Ownership
Others
Percentage of household income from broiler industry
0 to 20 percent
21 to 40 percent
41 to 60 percent
61 to 80 percent
81 to 100 percent

15.5
13.1
4.7
3.8
6.3

32.43
13.51
13.51
16.22
1.35

25.20
32.40
20.20
12.20
6.50
3.50

12.16
56.76
14.86
9.46
6.76
0.00

28.60
53.80
7.40
10.20

16.22
79.73
4.05
0.00

On an average an individual broiler grower: Raises 470,556 broiler birds; Owns 86 percent of
production land; Applies litter on 46 percent of crop land;
*
Source: US census bureau at http://factfinder.census.gov
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18.92
22.97
22.97
21.62
13.51
71.62
20.27
8.11
20.27
9.46
20.27
22.97
27.03

The data contains the information on three alternative approaches to mitigate nutrient
pollution generated by broiler producers in Louisiana. The data contains general information for
BMP adoptions, broiler producers’ willingness to participate in the production termination
programs, and the amount they need to terminate the production process partially or fully. The
data also provides information on willingness to pay values as pollution abatement cost. The
willingness to pay values represent broiler producer’s desired amount to pay for pollution
abatement in the form of tax. In addition, a separate section adds the information on manure
application and storage approaches employed by broiler producers. The detailed description of
data and variables used in this dissertation are presented on the “DATA AND METHOD”
sections of the associated essays.
II.

DATA DESCRIPTION

The first section provides the information on farm size and manure application
approaches employed by the growers. Farm size is represented by numbers of broiler birds raised
per year (Figure 2.2).

% individuals

Broiler raised by Louisiana farmers
18.0
16.0
14.0
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0

15.9 15.9
14.8

14.8

10.2
9.1
8.0
6.8
4.5

<1 1to2 2to3 3to4 4to5 5to6 6to7 7to8 >8
broiler no (100,000)

Figure 2.2: Farm size measured by number of broiler
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More than thirty one percent of farmers raise 300-500 thousand broilers per year. Nearly
seven percent farmers are small broiler growers with less than one hundred thousand broiler
birds in a year. In general, one house accommodates twenty five thousand broiler birds. Most of
the houses are built in between 1985 to 1994 (Figure 2.3) when the demand for chicken
increased rapidly and demand for red meat dropped down (See Figure A1 in Appendix).

Broiler houses built by years
2%
13%

22%

26%

37%

1954 to 1964

1965 to 1974

1975 to 1984

1985 to 1994

1995 to 2003

Figure 2.3: Broiler houses built by years.
Thirty seven percent of broiler housings are built in the years from 1985 to 1994.
Macdonald (2008) also listed more than sixty five percent of the broiler houses nationwide which
were built in between the years of 1986 and 2000. Only two percent of the houses built in
between 1954 and 1964 are still in operation (Figure 2.3). Most of those houses are retrofitted to
fit with the new technology for competitive production. Figure 2.4 shows the number of houses
retrofitted by years.
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Retrofited broiler houses
140

No of houses

120
100
80
60
40
20
Years

0
1954 to 64

65 to 74

Houses built

75 to 84

85 to 94

95 to 2003

Houses retrofited

Figure 2.4: Broiler houses retrofitted to include new technology.
The second section presents background information on broiler production in Louisiana
and its impact on water sources. The data contains information on three alternatives measures to
mitigate water pollution including BMPs adoptions, terminating production process, and paying
pollution abatement cost in the form of tax.
The average number of birds produced by Louisiana broiler farmers is 480,000 producing
approximately 600 tons of broiler litter. Existing litter disposal and management by broiler
growers often fail to account for nutrient contents of the litter, nutrient required by the plant and
nutrient content of the soil. On average, Louisiana broiler growers cake out the litter five times in
one year (Table 2.2). Cake out is a process of removing litter near watering and evaporating
cooling system normally after each flock of birds are removed for marketing . The remaining
loose litter is then reused for the new flock until it is ready to be replaced.
The litter taken out during the cake out process or the cleaning process is piled in the
storage facilities until the time for land spreading. In general, the data shows more than fifty
percent of producers keep the litter on pile for only six months (figure 2.5).
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Litter remains in pile
3%
12%

55%

30%

Six months

Twelve months

Twenty four months

Others

Figure 2.5: Duration of litter remains in piles.
Additionally, an individual farmer has been spreading litter on production land for seven
years on average. Pasture land receives broiler litter up to six times a year (Figure 2.6). The
result indicates that more than twenty five percent of respondents apply litter on their pasture
land at least five/six times a year. Whereas, the application on crop land is almost zero. Only
about 1.3 percent of respondents apply litter on crop land about one to two times a year.
Therefore, it can be said that the litter is applied on pasture land irrespective of nutrient
content of soil and nutrient need of pasture land, whereas, only one or two application of
fertilizer (nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium) are needed based on climatic condition and
variety of grass grown by the farmers (Barnhart, 1997). These applications of broiler litter, a
common practice by Louisiana broiler farmers imply an over-application of litter on available
crop and pasture land. This indicates that the land application of litter is treated as litter disposal
without any concern over crop nutrient need or the environmental quality.
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Reasons for not selling litter

18%

25%

6%

51%

Market is not available

Use on crop

Use on pasutre

Distribute for free

Figure 2.6: Stated reasons for not selling broiler litter.
The excessive litter application in pasture land mainly results from absence of a well
functioning litter market and imperfect information about the benefits of broiler litter on crop and
pasture land. More than twenty five percent of broiler growers in Louisiana stated the absence of
a litter market as their main reasons for not selling the byproduct (Figure 2.7). In addition
eighteen percent of the broiler producers distribute litter to their neighbors and other receivers for
free, where the underlying reason is absence of a broiler trading market (Figure 2.7).
It is well recognized that the litter applications replace commercial fertilizer; however, it
poses a serious concern over the economic gain relative to the conventional commercial
fertilizer. The cost of litter loading transportation, litter spreading, and the relative cost of
commercial fertilizers are among the main economic variables affecting substitutability of litter
to replace commercial fertilizer.
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Table 2.2: Description of manure management by Louisiana broiler growers
Variables

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

1.77

4.61

0

25

Litter spreading cost ($/acre)

5.40

12.16

0

60

No of times an individual cakes out the litter

4.44

2.23

0

8

Litter loading cost ($/ton)

Broiler litter, the byproduct of meat production, is generally used on pastures and hay
lands after the removal from broiler houses in Louisiana. Nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium
are the major elements that the plants require in relatively larger proportion. On average, one dry
ton of broiler litter provides 57.5 lbs nitrogen, 51.4 lbs of phosphorus and 39.8 lbs of potassium10
where the nutrient content of litter found to vary from 34.0 to 89 lbs/ton of nitrogen, 32.0 to 67.2
lbs/ton of phosphorus and 16.0 to 48.2 lbs/ton of potassium. The nutrient content of litter
depends on the weather condition, material used for bedding, feed etc.
Table 2. 3: Manure handling by Louisiana broiler growers.
Std.
Variables
Mean Dev

Min

Max

No of times an individual cakes out the litter a
year

4.44

2.23

0

8

No of years that individuals have been
applying litter on crop and pasture land

6.98

10.81

0

37

Sell litter = 1

0.53

2.67

0

25

Store litter = 1

0.58

0.62

0

4

The nutrient rich broiler litter is generally transported from production sites to the
application sites. The existing research shows the litter transportation posed a great concern over
the economic gain as compared to the conventional commercial fertilizer (Kellog, et al., 2000;
10

Source: Nutrient content of broiler litter. Texas cooperative Extension, the Texas A & M University System.
http://gallus.tamu.edu/extension%20publications/waste/nutrientcontent.pdf
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Fleming et al. 1998). The cost of litter loading, transportation, litter spreading, and the relative
cost of commercial fertilizers are among the main economic variables affecting substitutability of
litter to replace commercial fertilizer.
Louisiana broiler producers transfer litter for about 4.5 miles whereas, the cost of litter
transportation is not cost prohibitive up to one hundred miles from production site (Pellitier, et
al. 2001). About 53% of respondents stated that they sell the byproduct too but the price they
receive is very low, which is only about $6.99, whereas Paudel et al. (2002-2003) stated litter
should command as much as $35.60 per ton based on nutrient content of broiler litter.
Potential Use of Broiler Litter in Louisiana
The main agricultural production area in Louisiana occurs in the north-eastern part, where the
broiler production is also a major agricultural component. Figure 2.7 and 2.8 show the land use
classification based on crop grown in study area and in Louisiana. The crop-based production
system is also found in south-western and south-central Louisiana.

Figure 2.7: Land use pattern in study area
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The main crops grown in Louisiana are sugarcane, soybeans, corn, rice and cotton. Based
on the nutrient requirement of the major crops grown in Louisiana soybean is the only crop
where poultry litter may not be the good source of nutrient since it needs no additional nitrogen
for the production. The nutrient components are not separable in broiler litter and therefore, the
litter may not be a potential nutrient source for legumes. Other crops can absorb the litter
production without affecting the environment adversely and within Louisiana, if managed
properly.

Figure 2.8: Land use classification of Louisiana.
Table 2.4 details the litter production from the broiler producing parishes in Louisiana.
Estimated tonnage of litter production and associated nutrient contents are also presented for the
study region in the table 2.4. The table determines whether the county produces more broiler
litter than the crop production in the parish can absorb. This determination of a parishes being
excess/deficit depends on the acreage of crop production, recommended nutrient levels, total
quantity of litter production, and nutrient content of litter at the time of application.
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Table 2.4: Crop area, crop-nutrient demand and the nutrient supply from broiler production
Parishes
Bienville

Production
broiler/major crops

Total Production
(lbs)/acre

No of
broiler birds

24,174,220

4,395,313

Broilers (Total)

Litter produced
(tons/yr)

679

51

20

20

Hay

5,000

33

33

33

Broilers (Total)

125,100,900

22,745,618

53
110

17

7

7

Hay

27,000

176

176

176

Total crop nutrient requirement

192

182

182

Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production

825

725

569

68

68

68

92,702,725

16,855,041

Excess

Excess

21,069

10,500

Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production

68

68

68

611

537

421

1,143

1,005

788

Deficit

Major crops are vegetables where broiler litter application is not an appropriate option
Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production
Broilers (Total)
Corn

97,100,000

17,654,545

17,010

1,276

510

510

9,890

0

247

148

Sorghum

4,626

278

81

81

19,000

124

124

124

1,677

962

863

640

563

441

14,949

1,121

448

448

Sorghum

4,082

245

71

71

Hay

1,800

Total crop nutrient requirement
Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production
Broilers (Total)
Corn

23,939,000

4,352,545

Total crop nutrient requirement
Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production
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Excess

22,068

Soybean
Hay

Ouachita

53
140

223

Broilers (Total)

Litter based classification
(surplus/deficit)

28,432

Total crop nutrient requirement

Natchitoches

83
159

Corn

Hay

Lincoln

K(ton)

Corn

Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production

Jackson

P (ton)

5,494

Total crop nutrient requirement
Claiborne

N (ton)

Deficit

5,441

12

12

12

1,378

531

532

158

139

109

Deficit

Table 2.4 Contd.
Sabine

Broilers (Total)

165,175,000

Hay

30,031,818

37,540

2,200

Total crop nutrient requirement
Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production
Union

Broilers (Total)

342,269,282

Hay

3,500

62,230,779

Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production
1,450,000

263,636

14

14

14

1,089

957

751

23

23

23

23

23

23

2,256

1,984

1,556

330

Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production

Excess

Excess

Excess
10

8

7

20

8

8

Total crop nutrient requirement

20

8

8

Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production

47

42

33

19

19

19

Total crop nutrient requirement

19

19

19

Nutrients equivalent supplied by parish's broiler production
Total nutrient supplied by broiler production in major broiler growing parishes of
Louisiana

49

43

34

5,843

5,138

4,030

Broilers (Total)
Corn

Winn

14

Major crops are vegetables where broiler litter application is not an appropriate option
Broilers (Total)

Webster

14

77,788

Total crop nutrient requirement
Vernon

14

Broilers (Total)
Hay

7,200,000

1,309,091

1,636

265

7,400,000

1,345,455

1,682

2,900

25

Excess

Excess
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CHAPTER THREE
ADOPTION OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (BMPs) TO MITIGATE
NUTRIENT POLLUTION: A DURATION ANALYSIS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Best management practices (BMPs)11 are structures or management practices adopted by
farmers to reduce the diffused source of pollution in agricultural practices. Accelerating BMPs
adoption has been one of the urgent objectives of reducing nutrient pollution associated with
agricultural production practices. The non-point source management program established by
section 319 of the Clean Water Act centered its goal on reducing non-point source pollution
through voluntary adoption and implementation of BMP. Currently, cost-share up to ninety
percent and fixed payments, are provided to encourage farmers to adopt these environment
friendly practices. Despite these incentive payments and cost-share mechanism, there has been a
concern that the diffusion of BMP remains very slow generating a serious concern over
achieving the desired level of pollution reduction.
The BMP adoptions require investment to reduce pollution externality where investors
fail to experience a full benefit of their investments. The need of private investment to produce
public goods becomes the main hindrance for BMP adoption. Other likely reasons for slow rate
of BMP adoptions are the uncertainty of outcome, yield and cost, larger amount of initial and
recurring investments, and less feasible options when planning horizon is limited (Valentin et al.,
2004; Gillespie et al., 2007).
These characteristic of BMP force the broiler producers to delay or avoid investment on
BMP adoption. Potential adopters thus tend to wait until the utility from incentive payment for

11

The Best Management practices under this study are; Filter strips; Field borders; Grassed waterways; Wildlife
corridors; Critical area planting; and Compost facility.
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adoption equals the disutility associated with the cost of adoption, or until the time when benefits
from adoption outweigh the cost (punishment caused by stringent regulation) associated with
pollution generation.
The duration of time that a farmer decides to wait, until he/she adopts a practice, depends
on individual as well as other farm level characteristics. Although, farmers are generally exposed
to these practices over time, they decide to adopt the practice only after a certain time. Some
individual tend to be more interested on adopting than others and some farm characteristic favor
some BMP adoption better than others. Thus, the individual and farm specific characteristics
contribute differently on BMP adoption decision resulting into individual specific heterogeneity
among BMP adoptions.
Furthermore, some individual or the farm level characteristics favor multiple BMP
adoptions while others hinder the adoption of second/third practices. The occurrence of multiple
adoptions by the same individual generates correlation among the practices by a particular
individual. The dependence among adoptions originates from the fact that the events of BMP
adoptions share some characteristics that are unobserved or unmeasured at the time of survey.
For example, adoption of one BMP practice may make another adoption more/less likely.
Studies have acknowledged the occurrence of multiple BMP adoptions (Gillespie et al.,
2007; Cooper, 2003; Dorfman, 1996). Gillespie et al. (2007) examines adoption decision of
sixteen best management practices while Cooper (2003) and Dorfman (1996) examine five and
two BMPs. These studies failed to accommodate the interdependence on adoption decision of
different management practices caused by individual specific heterogeneity or event (adoption)
dependence in their analysis.

28

Thus, the most appealing issues that have been remained unaddressed in the BMP
literature are dealing with correlation among adoptions caused by individual specific
heterogeneity as well as event dependence. Studies failing to accommodate such correlation
provide bias and inefficiency in the parameter estimates. Therefore, the validity of the research
done without allowing the correlation among adoption decisions remains questionable.
Therefore, the main objective of this section is to develop farm level model of BMP
adoption allowing the individual specific heterogeneity as well as the event dependence among
multiple BMP adoptions. I employ the duration model to understand what variables influence
farmers to wait and eventually decide to adopt the BMPs. The focus remains on the covariates
affecting the time to adopt BMP. While evaluating the important factors affecting the time to
adopt, this study accommodates the individual specific heterogeneity as well as event
dependence assumed to exist in the data set.
I employ the Cox proportional hazard model to evaluate the factors affecting the
diffusion of BMP. The analysis provides better estimates of the factors affecting the slow rate of
BMP adoption after correcting for the event dependence and heterogeneity. More specifically
a) I employ variance corrected models which simply corrects the covariance matrix
leading to more reliable hypothesis testing.
b) I employ shared frailty model to allow for the individual specific characteristic
(random effects).
c) Finally, I employ conditional frailty model to allow for the individual heterogeneity
as well as event dependence that occurs on multiple adoptions.
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II.

LITERATURE REVIEW

BMP Adoptions
Most of the empirical work on the field of technology adoption and technology diffusion
are focused on the field of technologies that enhance the profitability of a firm (Abdulai and
Huffman, 2005). Adoption of new technologies designed to reduce the adverse effect of
agricultural practices on natural resources has also been a focus of recent studies.
A few examples include evaluating factors affecting BMP adoption decision (Kim et al.
2005); effect of BMP adoption on farm profitability (Valentin et al. 2004); incentive level to
enhance adoption of conservation practices (Cooper and Keim, 1996; Devuyst and Ipe, 1999).
Some attempts have been made to examine the reasons for the slow rate of BMP adoption
(Gillespie et al. 2007) from the perspective of evaluating the factors hindering the adoption
decision of a producer.
These studies conclude the farmers are less likely to implement in conservation practices
due to uncertain results, larger amount of investments, and less feasible options when a planning
horizon is limited (Valentin, et al., 2004). The age of farmers, scale of production and
productivity levels of farmers are also considered to be main contributing factors of farmers’
decisions to adopt and implement the best management practices (Rahelizatovo and Gillespie,
2004). In addition, uncertainty about soil conditions, production levels, associated profits and
risk taking behaviors of producers are also responsible for the slow adoption rates of newer
technologies of farming practices (Isik and Khanna, 2003).
Most of the studies in the area of technology adoption associated with farming practices
often tend to use binomial or multinomial logit and probit models (Dorfman, 1996: Neill and
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Lee, 2001; Cooper, 2003; Kim et al. 2005). These studies base their analysis on the individual’s
adoption behavior at a particular point in time.
In general, BMP adoption should reveal a slow increasing trend in the initial stages –
eventually increasing, once the farmers become more familiar with the new practices.
Technology diffusion theory suggest that the adoption rate improves at an increasing rate once
the individuals become better informed about the potential benefits – eventually slowing down
after a certain point, thus producing an S-shaped adoption curve.
The existing studies neglect the dynamic aspects of BMP adoption and fail to
accommodate the effects of regressors on the time path of an adoption which is an important
element while studying the slow process of BMP adoption. Even though the models explain why
some producers adopt/do not adopt at a given time, the models lack the examination of reasons
why some individuals adopt sooner or later than others.
Duration Analysis, Heterogeneity and Event Dependence
The duration or the failure time model examines the patterns of BMP adoption and
diffusion along with evaluating the effects of individual’s characteristics on the timing of BMP
adoption. Duration analysis is originally employed in biomedical research (Hougard, 1995,
Duchateau et al, 2002). Recent use of this approach accommodates the studies in technology
adoption (Karshena and Stoneman, 1993; Bapista 2000), labor economics (Han and Hausman,
1990: Addison and Pedro 2004; An et al. 2004), marketing research (Gonul and Srinivasan,
1993) and agricultural economics (Burton, et al. 2003, Fuglie ad Kascak, 2003).
The duration model, in the context of farming technology adoption, evaluates the impact
of covariates on the time to adoption since the technology became available to farmers (Dadi,
2004). Dadi (2004) estimates adoption behavior of Ethiopian farmers using the duration model.
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The estimates suggest timing of adoption is influenced by the incentive payment received by
farmers. The probability that a farm exits from the state of non-adoption to adoption (represented
by a hazard rate) is influenced by the economic incentive observed by farmers (Dadi, 2004). In
fact, the rate measures the proportion of adopters during a particular time  compared to those
who have not adopted until time   1.

Similarly, the duration model used to evaluate the diffusion of conservational practices

supports a very slow rate of adoption (Fuglie and Kascak, 2003). Diffusion patterns suggest
some factors have comparatively stronger effect at the early stages of adoption process (Baptista,
2000) as compared to later stage. The pattern of adoption over time is explained by the farm as
well as individual producer’s characteristics (Baptista, 2000).
Further, the timing of adoption is correlated within a geographical area supporting the
notion that the surrounding farming operations also affect the process of technology adoption
(Abdulai and Hufman, 2005). Also, the individuals bear different individual or firm specific
characteristics that may generate a higher or lower adoption rate for some cases than others. For
example, a producer having varied level of soil characteristics or building structures may
influence the likelihood that they will adopt the BMP.
Some producers bearing similar characteristics tend to behave similarly on adoption
decision than others. Such behavior introduces heterogeneity across individuals and correlation
within groups having similar characteristics. Sometimes, an individual may adopt more than one
BMP simultaneously. In such case, the adoptions are correlated within subject and are
heterogeneous among subjects.
Wei, Lin and Weissfeld (1989) illustrate an example that includes recurrence of tumors
on cancer patients. Their model assumes the patients are at risk of developing multiple tumors
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from the beginning. The same concept is borrowed in the context of BMP adoption where the
broiler producers are likely to adopt from the onset of BMP. The core concept is that the
adoption of one BMP may affect the happening of another adoption either positively or
negatively given the fact that these adoptions come from the same individual. Thus, the event
occurrences share some unobserved characteristics of the individuals.
Current studies employing the hazard model allows those correlations within a group and
heterogeneity among individuals through corrected variances (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn,
2002; Jensen and Ahlburg, 2004). These models correct the variance covariance matrix to
provide valid hypothesis testing. There are other sets of studies which believe that the
heterogeneity and event dependence generate biased parameter and therefore need suitable
models to work for the issues. Shared frailty models have been suggested for allowing individual
heterogeneity (Hougaard, 1995; Duchateau et al., 2002) and conditional frailty model for
allowing repeated event process (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2007).
Recently, the conditional frailty approach has been used in order to accommodate
individual heterogeneity as well as the multiple event dependence. The model is suggested to
provide asymptotically unbiased and efficient estimates in presence of heterogeneity as well as
event dependence (Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef, 2006). As per my knowledge the model is
employed in Medical (Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef, 2006) and political research (BoxSteffensmeier et al. 2007) and this study will be the first application in the field of economics.
III.

MODEL

Basic Model
The duration model has been used in agricultural technology adoption and diffusion
literature by several authors (Dadi, 2004; Fuglie and Kascak 2003; Baptista, 2000; Abdulai and
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Huffman 2005). It evaluates the impact of covariates on the time to adopt the BMP from the time
that it became available to farmers. Consider a set of farmers 

1,2, … … ,  are examined

from a time when the first BMP became available (time zero  ), to a failure time  , when a

farmer adopts a BMP; or to a censoring time (survey time,   . The observed time for an
individual is a random variable denoted by 

min  ,   with an indicator  . The  takes

a value of one, if failure time  is observed (adoption occurred before the survey) and zero

otherwise (censored). The main interest of time-to-adoption data are (a) The survivor function,
defined as the probability that the adoption has not occurred at time , that is adoption has not
occurred until time   1.

  

    

1  

(b) The hazard functions of  , which is defined as the probability that the spell is

completed at time  given that it is not completed by anytime before .
  

! "  #  $ %|  

%

lim



(c) The cumulative density function of  which is expressed as;
  



' (%(


The duration models and the analysis of duration, in general, are formulated in terms of

hazard of failure or the distribution of duration of a spell denoted by t * .

It is assumed that the variation in the distribution of the duration is characterized by a

vector of + explanatory variables , -

./ , .0 , … … … , .1 2. In case of the proportional hazard

model, the hazard is expressed as a product of baseline hazard and some function that explains

how the risk of adoption is associated with the different values of covariates. The hazard function
of an  3 individual at time  is thus expressed as;
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where,   is the baseline hazard function which provides the shape to the hazard function.

The   is assumed to be an unspecified baseline hazard corresponding to an individual whose

covariates takes values of zero. In absence of any effect of covariates on the hazard function, the
baseline hazard shows the value of risk common to all individuals. The baseline hazard explains
the duration dependence such as whether the hazard rate of an individual adopting a BMP
depends on the time that an individual has already spent in the spell.

The 4 -  represents a non-negative functions of - . The widely used functional form

for the hazard model as proposed by Cox (1972) is 4- 

exp- 5 . The model that uses

exponential functional form of explanatory variable along with the baseline hazard is widely
known as the Cox proportional hazard model. Under the Cox proportional hazard model, the
hazard function is expressed as;

 exp6- 78

 |- 

(3.1)

The vector 7 represents unknown regression parameters explaining the dependence of hazard on
the explanatory variables. The corresponding survival function can be expressed as;
where,  

 |- 

 exp6- 78

9.+ : ;  (%(< represents the survival function of an individual whose all


covariates are equal to zeros. Assuming no ties among the event times, the parameters can be
estimated by maximizing the partial likelihood function as suggested by Cox (1972)
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NO is observed duration. Computationally, maximizing the log of the likelihood function is more

convenient to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates. Further, the variance is obtained by
using second derivative of the likelihood function evaluated at estimated coefficient.
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Correlated Time-to-event Data
Correlated event times may occur due to recurrent event processes such as multiple BMP
adoptions by an individual. In case of repeated occurrences, correlation among the event times
can arise from the following two sources;
a)

Individual Heterogeneity
Individual broiler producers bear different individual or firm specific characteristics,

some of which may be unknown, unmeasured or un-measureable to the researchers. Those
unobserved characteristics generate higher or lower rate of adoptions for some BMPs than
others. For example, producers have diverse level of soil characteristics and building structures
which may influences the likelihood that they will adopt the BMP but either can’t be measured
or are unknown to the researcher at the time of data collection. As a result, some producers tend
to adopt faster than others introducing heterogeneity across individuals. Furthermore, a producer
who adopts one BMP may be more inclined or resistant to another BMP adoption. This fact
generates correlation among recurrent BMP adoptions or the timing of those BMPs adoptions.
b)

Event Dependence
In some time-to-event models, an occurrence of one BMP adoption may make successive

events more or less probable. For example, adoption of one BMP may provide producers
incentive/disincentive to adopt another set based on how they perceive the benefit/cost of
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adopting previous BMP. In any case, the likelihood of adoption is a function of previous
occurrence inducing within individual level correlation among the observations.
Thus, the correlation among events can either be produced by individual heterogeneity or
by event dependence or by both. In the presence of individual level heterogeneity or recurrence
of events, it is realistic to assume lack of independence among individual events (Collet, 2003).
The correlation among event times violates the assumption of independence assumed by the Cox
proportional hazard model. Failing to account for the correlation among events and analyzing
correlated events produce biased and inefficient estimates (Kelly and Lim, 2000). Doing so
overstates the level of information that each observation provides, leading to incorrect standard
errors. In addition, the analysis restricts the impacts of covariates to be the same across the
multiple events, while there may be different effects from one event to another.
The variance corrected models estimate the standard Cox proportional model and adjusts
the covariance matrix in order to allow for the correlation due to repeated events and/or
individual heterogeneity. The Cox model provides consistent estimates to the population
parameters even in the presence of correlation. However, the covariance matrix is inappropriate
for hypothesis testing (Lin and Wei 1989). One of the most widely used variance corrected
models is a model developed by Wei et al. (1989). The model allows multiple events to have
different baseline hazards so that the hazard function can differ from the first BMP adoption to
the second BMP adoption and so on.
Each individual farmer is considered to be at risk for all the consequent events from the
beginning. More specifically, individual farmers are at risk set of adopting all available BMPs at
all the time prior to the occurrence of that particular event. The observations are then stratified
based on the number of adoptions occurred. A separate baseline hazard is constructed for the first
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adoption then the second and so on. However, the effects of covariates are assumed to be
constant over the different events.
The Cox proportional hazard model changes into the following expression while allowing

for stratification based on event occurrence. The individual farmers are stratified into Z (Z
1, 2, . .6 available set of BMPs) categories based on the number of BMPs adopted.
=  7
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à
∑G
EHI ∑ HI BE` ]^_-@` 7

J

K@`

(3.3)

The variance corrected model takes account of the inefficiency contributed by the
heterogeneity through correcting the standard errors. However, the approach fails to incorporate
the heterogeneity effect on the estimates and therefore the estimates remain inconsistent (Kelley
and Lim 2000).
The frailty model incorporates the heterogeneity into the model estimators by treating the
frailty term as random draws from a known parametric distribution. Experiencing an event is
assumed to be independent of the chosen distribution. The frailties are unobserved random effect
across individuals and are assumed to be constant over time for a particular individual. The
model also treats the correlation due to repeated events as a special case of more general
heterogeneity induced by the individual specific characteristics (Box- Steffensmeier , 2007;
Vaupel, 1979).
With the inclusion of random effects in the proportional hazard model, the hazard rate
equation changes as follows;

c |-c 

 exp6.c 7 $ d 8

(3.4)

where, d is the vector of random effects or frailty for  3 individual and Z is the number of
possible events for each individual.
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The frailty models have been criticized because of lacking sufficient theoretical support
on choosing a particular parametric distribution. Additionally, the estimates are generally
sensitive to the selected error distribution (Kosorok et al. 2004). The random effects model can
be presented in the following form so as to make easier illustration of functional form of the
random effects;

 |-c 

 exp6.c 78 expd 

 ( exp6.c 78

The random effects are assumed to have gamma distribution for which the probability density
function is expressed as; hi (
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.The interest here is on the variance of the random

effects , PQ!d , which is used to explain heterogeneity. For gamma distribution variance is

assumed to be PQ!(
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Now, the likelihood function for the model, conditional on the random effects becomes;
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In fact, both the variance-corrected proportional hazard model as well as random effects
model has been used in order to account for the correlated events (Jensen and Ahlburg, 2004;
Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2002). Table 3.1 shows the ability of different models to handle the
heterogeneity and event dependence.
To allow within subject correlation through event dependence as well as the individual
heterogeneity, there is a need to develop a new model. In this model, event dependence is
controlled through “event based stratification” and the unobserved heterogeneity through
inclusion of a random factor in the model (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2007). This new model is
called the conditional frailty model which originates using gap time where the parameters are
interpreted in terms being at the risk of kth event after the occurrence of previous one.
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The hazard of observing kth event for ith individual is then expressed as (BoxSteffensmeier et al. 2007);

c |- 

c   cX/ exp6-c 7 $ d 8

(3.6)

where, k represents the number of events (BMP adoptions) that an individual producers
experience. c is the baseline hazard rate that varies with the number of events that an

individual experiences.   cX/  represents a gap time from Z  1th event occurrence to Zth

event occurrence. The d represents an unknown vector of random effects contributed by

individuals and each individual contain a random effect that is shared within recurrent events.
Then the partial likelihood of the event occurrence becomes;
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Table 3.1: Alternative models, their abilities to handle heterogeneity and event correlation,
their pitfalls and advantage

Models

Does it handle
Event
Heterogeneity
correlation

Pitfall of
the model

Advantage of the
model

Cox-proportional
Hazard model

No

No

Assumption
not met

Easy to estimate

Variance Corrected
model 1

No

Yes

Inconsistent

Comparatively
Efficient Estimates

Variance Corrected
model 2

No

Yes

Inconsistent

Comparatively
Efficient Estimates

Frailty Model

Yes

No

Large
standard
errors.

Reduced bias

Conditional Frailty
Model

Yes

Yes

Large
standard
errors

Asymptotically
consistent and
efficient estimates

Note: Variance corrected model 1 corrects variance using cluster corrected robust standard errors. Variance
corrected model 2 is developed by Wei et al. (1989) which creates a separate baseline hazard for each event
occurrence.
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IV.

DATA

The state of interest in this chapter is non-adoption which is defined as the state at which
an individual is at the risk of adoption. And the event of interest is the exit from non-adoption to
the adoption of the practice. The duration of adoption starts from the first recorded adoption of a
practice (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993) and ends when an individual either adopts a practice
from a set of BMPs or is censored. The spells that were not completed before the survey
(summer 2004) were considered to be censored. The non adopters are censored at the calendar
year of 2004 when the survey was conducted.
The time starting from the year 1954 to the time of adoption or time of censor is
considered to be the dependent variables for the models except for the conditional frailty model
(Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993; Fuglie and Kascak, 2003). The time that a farmer waits before
adopting a BMP is measured by the number of years elapsed since the introduction of BMP
(assuming first BMP was introduced in 1954).
The conditional frailty model requires data organized in a different format than the other
models require. The setting of the data for the conditional frailty model is listed in the Appendix
B. The repeated adoptions of BMP are assumed to be recurrence of events. Under the case of
BMP adoption, a recurrence of event is defined as “the event occurrence where an individual
adopts BMP/s more than once in his farming period or under the study period”.
The data used in this section comprise 88 broiler producers with 57 events of interest
(adoptions). Farmers are assumed to be exposed to six available BMPs once they became
available or the producer entered the firm. The producers who entered the business later than
1954 entered the risk set as soon as they entered the business (Dadi et al., 2004). For late entrants
the duration variable counted from the year they started in the broiler industry to the year they
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adopted the BMP/censored at the time of survey. This is because the BMP practices were already
available when the individual entered the business and they started to be at risk as soon as they
entered the business.

Figure 3.1: Total number of BMP adoptions over the years
There were six best management practices available or suggested to the producers. The
best management practices available or suggested to the producers are included in the survey and
are listed as follows;
Filter strips: Filter strips are designed for removing or blocking the sediments and other
nutrient pollutants from runoff. The strips are the area of vegetation adjacent to the stream if
there is one near or on the farm. The vegetative strips also increase the nutrient intake reducing
the leaching of excessive nutrients from the field to the water sources. The cost of adopting this
practice is 210 dollars per acre (2003)
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Field borders: Field boarders are the strips of perennial vegetation planted on the edge
of the fields. The borders are designed to control sediment runoff which carries excessive
phosphorus from the field to the water-bodies. Adoption cost per ft is about 0.10 dollars (2003).
Grassed waterways: The grassed waterways are natural or constructed vegetative
channel designed to stabilize the surface runoff. The grassed waterways help to prevent the
nutrient flow through sediment erosion. The estimated cost of adoption is 2400 dollars per acre.
Wildlife Corridors: These are designed to creating restoring and enhancing wildlife
habitat. The estimated cost of adoption is 25 dollars per acre.
Critical area planting: Critical area planting represents the plantations that are designed
for reducing erosion from highly erodible fields and the fields with greater slope (find better
words).

Figure 3.2: Percentage of Broiler Producers Adopting Best Management Practices
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Compost facilities: The facilities convert organic matter, such as dry poultry litter, dead
chickens or other poultry wastes into more uniform and less odored substance. The estimated
cost of building 6-bin composting facility is 18,000. Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of broiler
producers implementing different BMPs.
Explanatory Variables
a) Farm Characteristics
Number of broilers represents the total number of broiler birds raised by an individual
producer in 2003. The numbers are divided by 1000 for easier computational purpose. The larger
the number of birds implies a larger production level. The production size is found to be
positively related to the technology adoption (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993) including BMP
adoption (Rahelizatovo and Gillespie, 2004).
Farm income is defined as the income associated with broiler production. Producers with
higher farm income are more likely to adopt BMP (Gillespie et al., 2007). In this study, farm
income is defined as a dummy variable to indicate whether a farm is earning a positive or a
negative profit. Positive profit provides a financial flexibility to the producers to be willing to
adopt BMP.
b) Information Dissemination
The producers who have better information regarding BMP either through education or
exposition to the extension services are more likely to adopt BMP (Koundouri et al., 2006).
Level of education and contact with extension agents are employed to capture the effect of
information accessibility on BMP adoption. Education is a dummy variable indicating whether
an individual holds at least a college degree.
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Contact with extension agents was constructed using the information obtained indicating
whether an individual has visited the extension agents in the last year. The variable is then used
as a proxy for his/her general contact with the extension service providers. The variable
represents whether an individual has visited extension agents or have been visited by the agents
in the previous year. Individual producers who are exposed to the extension service are aware
about BMPs. Both the education (Gillespie et al., 2007) and contact with extension agents are
assumed to be positively affecting the BMP adoption (Koundouri et al., 2006).
c) Demographic Variables
Farmer’s own characteristics play a major role in the choice of technology adoption. The
variable, Age, provides mixed result. Age is positively associated with the likelihood of BMP
adoption (Gillespie et al., 2007), while it is negatively related with irrigation technology
adoption (Koundouri et al., 2006). Younger farmers are found to be more knowledgeable and
more risk taking due to longer planning horizons, and therefore, are more likely to adopt BMP
(Adesina and Zinnah, 1993).
Years of being in farming is considered to be an important factor on adoption decision
(Gillespie et al., 2007). Studies consider number of years in the business as experience of an
individual producer. However, in absence of successor we assume the coefficient associated with
this variable may have a negative sign. This is because the longer the time in the business, it is
more likely that the producers retire from the business. The existing literatures, however, show a
positive relationship of experience with the likelihood of adoption (Adesina and Zinnah, 1993).
Therefore, the coefficient associated with this variable may show either a positive or negative
sign.
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Business ownership is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is individually or
family owned. Individually owned businesses are more likely to adopt erosion and sediment
control BMPs. Having family members to take over the business, once the producer is retired,
extends the planning horizon. Thus having descendants to continue the business is hypothesized
to be positively related to the BMP adoption (Gillespie et al., 2007).
d) Policy Variable:
Policy variable is created as a dummy representing whether the adoption was before the
initiation of the cost-share program in 1996. Economic incentives associated with the adoption
increases the likelihood of technology adoption (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993).
Table 3.2: Summary statistics of variables used
Obs. Mean

Variables

Std. dev.
288.56

Min

Max

Number of broilers/1000

528 455.38

18 1900

Age of farmer at the time of survey

522

52.95

12.58

23

79

At least collage education =1

528

0.80

0.272

0

1

Individual ownership=0 otherwise=1

492

1.012

0.109

0

1

Number of years in the business

528

19.53

12.51

0

57

Income from broiler production positive income=1

510

0.894

0.307

0

1

Descendants to continue farming after retire

456

0.171

0.367

0

1

Adoption after 1996=1 otherwise=0

500

0.954

0.209

0

1

Contact with extension agent =1 otherwise=0

522

.586

.493

0

1

Calendar year of adoption

500

Duration from base year to adoption year or censor

500

1954 2004
19.35

12.19

0
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Note: There were 88 observation points obtained from the survey. With the individuals being at risk of adopting
six different practices within a set of BMP, the total number of observation becomes 528.
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V.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The duration models presented above are estimated to examine the time taken by broiler
producers to adopt BMP given its availability. The time to adoption is considered to be a
function of individual producer specific as well as farm specific characteristics. The model

estimates the probability of a producer adopting a BMP at a particular time  given that the
producer hasn’t adopted until time   1.

Table 3.3: Variance corrected models for BMP adoption (Cox regression model)
Variables

Coefficients

Hazard ratio

0.002***
(0.0007)

1.002

Experience

-0.020
(0.025)

0.980

Education

0.464
(0.631)

1.591

Age

0.002*
(.0008)

1.001

Farm income

0.114
(0.375)

1.011

Contd. after retirement

0.557
(0.589)

1.745

Ownership

-1.049
(0.818)

.0350

-3.500***
(0.414)

0.301

1.297***
(0.497)

3.659

Broiler numbers

Policy
Contact with extension agent

113.99***
-147.952

Wald test
Log likelihood
Note:

*

, ** and *** represents the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
The numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.
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Results from two variance corrected models are presented on table 3.3 and 3.4. The
results for two frailty models are presented on table 3.5 and 3.6. The tables present coefficient
estimates and their standard errors with hazard ratios. The first table (Table 3.3) presents the
result for the Cox proportion hazard model with cluster corrected robust standard errors. The
cluster corrected variance matrix is robust to any kind of intra cluster correlation and arbitrary
heterogeneity, given that the number of observations is relatively larger than the number of
groups (Wooldridge, 2002: page: 300). The second column presents the hazard ratio.
Table 3.4 contains results for the marginal model of Wei, Lin and Weissfeld (1989). The
Wei, Lin and Weissfeld (WLW) model allows separate baseline hazards for each event
occurrence. In addition, it allows all the individuals to be “at risk” of adopting any of the
available BMPs from the beginning of the observation period. Individual heterogeneity is taken
into account by using cluster corrected variance and the observations are stratified to allow for
different baseline hazards for each BMP adopted.
In presence of individual level heterogeneity, variance correction models may not suffice
to provide reliable parameter estimates since the model only corrects the variance-covariance
matrix and provides better hypothesis testing. Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2007) suggested using a
random effect model in order to estimate consistent parameters. Their study claims a significant
improvement on model performance while using the frailty model. I therefore estimate frailty
models which are presented on table 3.5 and table 3.6. The frailty models account for the
individual level heterogeneity assumed to exist among individual producers and event
dependence within an individual’s recurrent adoptions.
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Table 3.4: Variance correction models for BMP adoption (WLW model)
Variables

Coefficients

Hazard ratio

0.002***
(0.001)

1.002

Experience

-0.032
(0.028)

0.968

Education

0.093
(0.391)

1.593

Age

.0021**
(.001)

1.002

Farm income

0.093
(0.391)

1.097

Contd. after retirement

0.340
(0.637)

1.406

Ownership

-0.852
(0.789)

0.426

-1.755***
(0.574)

0.173

Broiler numbers

Policy

1.403*
(0.501)

Contact with extension agent

Wald test

61.05***

Log likelihood

-96.026

4.066

Note: * , ** and *** stands for the variable is significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 percent level of significance
respectively.

The first column in table 3.5 contains estimates for the shared frailty model and the
second column provides the hazard ratio associated with the models. The model incorporates
variations across individuals, which are unaccounted for the inclusion of observed variables.
These unobserved variations affect an individual’s susceptibility to adopt BMP. The
heterogeneity originates from the fact that some individuals are more susceptible to hazard of
adoption than others; however, the measured variables fail to account for those characteristics
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causing the variations on adoption. Some producers are frailer to the adoption due to such
unmeasured/unknown factors. The random effect parameter included in the model absorbs the
unknown factor causing heterogeneity in the BMP adoption. Thus the presence of unmeasured
variation can be determined by the inclusion of the random effects in the model. Since there are
multiple adoptions by one individual there, effects of unobserved characteristics are shared by
different adoptions.
A Likelihood ratio test is carried out to examine the presence of heterogeneity. The test

statistics measures whether the variance of the random effect (let’s denote it by v) term is greater

than zero. The result from likelihood test for v shows variance of the random effect is greater

than zero at 0.05 percent level of significance. The result indicates the presence of the random
effect. This result suggests that the unobserved heterogeneity is affecting the models where the
random effect might have originated from the individual heterogeneity or by event dependence.
Furthermore, event dependence is suspected as the data comes from the same individual
who may become more susceptible or resistant to adoption after adopting one BMP. In addition,
no theory or the analysis guides about the source of greater variance estimate of the random
effect parameter. The random effect can either be from individual heterogeneity or from event
dependence.
A conditional frailty model is employed to allow for the event dependence. The model
estimates different baseline hazards for each successive event. In addition, the model accounts
for the heterogeneity by allowing the estimation of random effect parameter into the model. The
conditional frailty model reduces bias in estimated parameters and/or reduces the size of variance
of random effect (v), as compared to variance corrected and shared frailty models (BoxSteffensmeier et al., 2007).
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Table 3.5: Individual heterogeneity model for BMP adoption (Shared frailty model)
Variables

Coefficients
(Robust Std. Err)

Hazard. Ratio

0.002*
(.001)

1.002

-0.090***
(0.036)

0.914

Education

0.383
(0.872)

1.466

Age

0.002*
(0.001)

1.002

Farm income

0.304
(0.351)

1.356

Contd. after retirement

0.486
(0.699)

1.625

Ownership

-2.685
(2.192)

0.068

-4.669***
(0.627)

.009

1.287**
(0.605)

3.625

Broiler numbers
Experience

Policy
Contact with extension agent

Theta

1.141
60.64***

Wald test
Log likelihood

-146.576

Shared frailty model: LR test of theta=0: w/0 = 2.75 Prob>=w/0 chibar2 = 0.049

Note: * , ** and *** stands for the variable is significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 percent level of significance
respectively.

Table 3.6 presents the result obtained from the conditional frailty model as suggested by
(Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef, 2006). The conditional frailty model is estimated using the R
software, as STATA and SAS lack the built-in function to perform a conditional frailty analysis.
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Once the observations are stratified based on events, using the conditional frailty model, the
estimated variance of the random effect reduces to zero. Such result indicates the heterogeneity
in the model is contributed by event dependence. The large variance of random factors appeared
in the shared frailty model disappeared with conditional frailty model. The result thus supports
the fact that the main source of within subject correlation was contributed by event dependence.
Hence, the result from conditional frailty model is used to interpret the results. Once
heterogeneity as well as the event dependence is accounted for, the estimated beta coefficients
are interpreted as “estimated change in logarithm of hazard ratio due to one unit change in a
covariate” (Collett 2003; page 90). So, the hazard ratio of exiting from the state of non-adoption
is ! *expx5y z when . changes by ! units. The hazard ratios are used to test the hypothesis of no

impact of the covariates on hazard of adoption. The hazard ratio, greater (smaller) than one, is
equivalent to the positive (negative) sign of the coefficients.
The size of farming is probably the most prominent variable on technology adoption

literatures (Abdulai and Huffman, 2005; Dadi et al. 2004; Dorfman, 1996, Adesina and Zinnah,
1993). The variable is positively related to the adoption decision (Adesina and Zinnah, 1993;
Abdulai and Huffman, 2005). In this study, number of birds represents the size of farming. The
farm size shows a positive effect on hazard of adoption. One unit in broiler number in the
analysis represent 1000 birds so, one unit increase in broiler number increases the conditional
probability of adoption by 0.1 %. The result indicates that duration of adoption decreases with
increase in the size of production. Thus the result implies that the larger firms are early adopters.
The experience in the business represents the years that an individual spent on broiler
production. The variable is negative and significant at a ten percent level of significance. One
year increase in year that an individual spent on farming decreases the hazard of adoption by four
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percent (1-.959=0.041). The significant negative impact of years spent on farming implies that an
individual who is involved in farming for many years tends to wait longer to adopt a best
management practice to reduce water pollution. The result implies that these individuals spent
long enough in the broiler business and are ready to retire from farming. Therefore, these
individuals are less likely to adopt the technology. Adesina and Zinnah, (1993) also finds the
effect of number of years in the farming to be insignificant on adoption of rice variety.
The significant positive effect of contact with extension agent on the likelihood of BMP
adoption (hazard greater than one) indicates that the broiler producers who meet extension agents
are more likely to adopt BMP as compared to those who do not. The producers exposed to
information through extension agents have conditional probability of adoption which is 1.32
times greater than those not exposed to extension agents (Abdulai and Huffman, 2005; Baptista,
2000).
Age of an individual producer is found to be significantly affecting the adoption of other
technology (Dadi et al. 2004) as well as BMP (Gillespie et al., 2007). The age variable on
technology adoption has been providing mixed effect on literatures. The younger individuals are
more likely to adopt new irrigation technology (Koundouri et. al, 2006). However, older
individuals are more likely to adopt BMP to reduce nutrient pollution (Gillespie et al., 2007).
The age variable in this study shows significant (at 0.10 level) with a positive sign indicating
older broiler producer are earlier adopters.
Ownership of farming practices has been found to influence the adoption decision of
technology (Rahelizatovo, 2002; Gillespie et al., 2007). If the production is an individual
operation, the conditional probability of adopting a technology is higher as compared to the
others. Gillespie et al. (2007) also finds positive effect on adoption if a family owns the farm.
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Table 3.6: Event dependence and heterogeneity models for BMP adoption (Conditional
frailty model)
Coefficients
(Robust Std. Err)

Haz. Ratio

0.0013**
(.0007)

1.001

Experience

-0.032*
(0.018)

0.959

Education

0.087
(0.632)

1.092

Age

0.031*
(0.018)

1.031

Farm income

0.558
(0.376)

1.748

Contd. after retirement

0.311
(0.479)

1.365

Ownership

1.310*
(0.801)

3.709

Policy

-1.091*
(0.577)

0.336

Contact with extension agent

0.843**
(0.307)

Variable
Broiler numbers

Theta

2.323

0.00

Wald test

21.7***

Log likelihood

-117.5

R square

0.186

Note: * , ** and *** stands for the variable is significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 percent level of significance
respectively.

Policy dummy to measure the effect of changes in incentive payment as a cost-share is
found to be highly negative. The unexpected result of this kind to some extent was contributed
by the within-subject correlation. This is because the magnitude of negative effect reduced to
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1.09 from 4.669. I therefore, presume that there might be other unobserved factors that affected
this factor to be negative (Dadi et al. 2004).
While comparing estimates from the shared frailty model with the conditional frailty
model the only significant change is found in ownership of the business. The variable changes
the sign going from shared frailty to the conditional frailty model. In addition, the magnitude of
negative policy effect becomes smaller on conditional frailty model.
VI.

CONCLUSION

A slow rate of BMP adoption has been a serious concern among policy makers. Even
more, the increasingly stringent government regulation has been a fear factor for the producers to
adopt BMPs. The existing literature on BMP adoption discusses the factors affecting the
adoption decision of agricultural producers. However, it fails to accommodate the factors related
to the diffusion process of BMPs over time. I examined why some producers adopt BMP faster
than others and what kind of factors affect the time to adoption decision. I employed a duration
model which accounts for the censored observation. In addition, the model also permits an
evaluation of the impact of farm and individual characteristics on the duration of adoption from
the time when the BMP became available.
The most appealing issue appeared, was the occurrence of multiple adoptions by some
broiler producers. The correlation among BMP adoptions may arise from individual level
heterogeneity and/or from event dependence in the presence of multiple adoptions. In order to
accommodate the correlation, I employed the variance correction approach which corrected the
variance covariance matrix to provide better hypothesis testing.
I allowed individual level heterogeneity to enter the model as a random factor. The result
showed a presence of heterogeneity by providing the larger variance of the random factor which
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entered in the third model (result of which is on table 3.5). The significantly greater variance for
the random factor suggested the estimates may not be correct since they are affected by the
presence of heterogeneity and/or event dependence.
The larger variance only suggests the presence of random effect but fails to indicate
where the random effect comes from. The random effect may either be from individual
heterogeneity or from event dependence. I therefore, ran a conditional frailty model, as suggested
by Box-Steffensmeier (2006), which is assumed to correct both the heterogeneity and event
dependence allowing different baseline hazards for different rank of adoption.
The result showed that the longer the farmers spend on broiler production the less likely
they are to adopt BMPs which are the investment on the programs that are designed for long
term goals. Larger and more informative farmers, through contact with extension agents and
education, are early adopters of the new management practices. Even though the result did not
show significant difference on parameter estimates from all four models, the parameter estimates
from conditional frailty models are assumed to be more reliable than the estimates from other
models.
The study found that the estimates suffered from random effect (frailty) which should be
taken into consideration while evaluating the factors associated with slow rate of BMP adoption.
The scope of this approach can be extended to other kinds of technology adoptions in the areas
of agriculture, for example, adoption of cost minimizing irrigation technology.
VII.
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CHAPTER FOUR
IS PRODUCTION TERMINATION A GOOD POLLUTION CONTROL
ALTERNATIVE? AN ASSESSMENT OF WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT VALUES BY
BROILER PRODUCERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Incentive payments have been a popular policy instrument to motivate agricultural
producers toward employing environmentally friendly production practices. Wetlands Reserve
Program (WRP), Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and Environmental Quality Incentive
Program (EQIP) are the major examples of the incentive payments to support producers to
employ environmentally friendly agricultural practices.
The EQIP is established to provide technical and financial support to the farmers who
agree to adopt environmentally friendly production practices (Classen and Horan, 2000). The
CRP encouraged the farmers to terminate the commodity production (either by switching to tree
or perennial grass planting or by idling the land) through incentive payments primarily to reduce
soil erosion and other negative impacts on ecosystem.
Other programs such as payment for restricted water use on agricultural production, as
implemented by the state of Georgia and the Dairy Termination Program (DTP) are additional
examples where farmers are paid to reduce production amount or cultivated acres. The Draught
Protection Act of Georgia pays farmers who voluntarily withdraw irrigation permit in lieu of
compensation to increase water flow in a river. On the other hand, the DTP of 1986-1987 offered
incentive payments to milk producers who were willing to reduce milk production either
temporarily (at least for five years) or permanently.
All of these programs provided incentive payments to the farmers participating
voluntarily in production termination programs or environmentally friendly agricultural
practices. Although, the goal of these programs could be one thing (reducing erosion in CRP,
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reducing water use in agriculture in Georgia’s ground water use incentive program, reducing
dairy cows numbers in DTP), but these programs resulted other benefits too (increasing
commodity prices in CRP, water conservation and reduction in crop output in Georgia).
A similar concept of incentive payments for production termination can be borrowed to
mitigate water pollution problems associated with broiler production in Louisiana. Thus, the
main focus of this chapter remains on the production control program with a direct consequence
of reducing pollution in a given watershed. Incentive payment is a viable option to motivate
Louisiana broiler producers to terminate (permanently or temporarily) the broiler production and
help reduce the water pollution in environmentally sensitive areas. Additionally, the incentive
payments help farmers to balance farm income while meeting the environmental goal.
The question remains on how to estimate the dollar amount that represents producers’
desired level of incentive that encourages them to participate in a production termination
program in order to mitigate water pollution in a watershed. In fact, it is difficult to obtain a
dollar value that a producer desires to receive to terminate the production practices. The dollar
amount that encourages producers can’t be obtained through market transactions. Contingent
valuation studies are designed to assess the amount that reflects a minimum monetary amount
required by the producers to relinquish one unit of broiler production from their current operation
level. The value is assumed to represent an amount of incentive payment that the farmers require
if they were to incorporate pollution reduction efforts on their production process. The payment
level is evaluated based on farmer’s household income, their perception about the governmental
role on pollution control, and other farm characteristics.
In order to examine the farmer’s desired level of incentive requirement, a clear
understanding of their utility function is required. It is because a producer should be paid the
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amount that leaves him/her at least indifferent to either continue (remain on same level of utility)
or to terminate the production practices (move to a new utility level with additional income in the
form of incentive). I examine producers’ willing to accept (WTA) amount which suffices the
producers to terminate their production practices and move to a new utility level.
It is assumed that by terminating the broiler production, the problem of nutrient pollution
can be mitigated through reduced level of broiler litter. Reducing12 litter production could be
one of the viable alternatives to save Louisiana watersheds adjacent to and encompassing broiler
production parishes from nutrient pollution. This chapter highlights the WTA value elicitation
and examination under the hypothetical but potential governmental policy of production
termination for pollution reduction.
This chapter is based on the assumption that the establishment of an appropriate baseline
incentive payment is important in order to avoid negative consequences of incentive payments
on either production process or in environmental services. For the purpose, it becomes
imperative to understand the underlying factors that impact the amount of incentive payments
that the broiler producers require. I, therefore, estimate a WTA function based on the survey data
collected from Louisiana broiler producers.
II.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Generally speaking, farmers fail to implement environmentally sound production
practices because of the perception that pollution reduction efforts provide low personal benefitcost ratio. In addition, if negative externalities from farming operations are not properly
penalized; farmers are less likely to incorporate this externality in the production function as they
are not liable for the pollution abatement cost. Under such circumstances, one of the approaches

12

Phytase can be added in the broiler diet which reduces phosphorus content in litter (Bosch et al. 1997 JAAE),
however, this may not be sufficient to reduce nutrient pollution in a given watershed.
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to mitigate the water pollution problem is through providing government incentive payments to
encourage farmers’ production practices with minimum environmental effect (Cooper, 1997;
Batie, 1999; Classen and Horan, 2000). If the incentive payment is substantial, the likelihood of
farmers’ participation as well as the acreage enrolled on environmentally friendly production
practices (Cooper, 1997) becomes significant.
Broiler farmers are willing to participate in the programs only if the size of the incentive
payment covers the full cost of participation (Classen and Horan, 2000). Wossink and Swinton
(2007) examined the cost of producing environmental services. The study showed how
complementary or substitutive relationships change the cost of producing environmental
services. Producing environmental service as complementary to market good costs less to the
producers as compared to the ones produced as substitutes which are produced outside of
agricultural practices (Wossink and Swinton, 2007). Thus, their study supports the idea of
bringing the farmer on pollution control programs with substantial amount of incentive payment.
However, recognizing an appropriate amount of incentive payment becomes difficult.
Establishing the incentive payment based on individuals’ production function becomes
inappropriate because of the varied nature of production function. The production cost of
environmental service depends on farm characteristics such as geographic areas, soil type etc.
making the prediction difficult (Classen and Horan, 2000).
The next approach of estimating the incentive payment depends on return from
agricultural land (Shaikh et al. 2007). Relying on the amount of return also becomes
inappropriate since it fails to accommodate nonmarket values, risk attitudes and unobservable
transaction cost. Thus, determining the baseline payments needed by producers in response to
establishing environmentally friendly production practices becomes a difficult task.
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The measure of WTA has widely been used to evaluate compensation requirement to
keep an individual’s utility at his/her desired level. The method is extensively used for the goods
lacking a clear market for the good in question. Either WTP or WTA can be employed to elicit
the value that an individual assign for the goods.
Goldar and Misra (2001) estimated resident’s WTA values to decrease the number of
trees in a public park, while, Brox et al. (2003) estimated the values in the context of water
pollution reduction. The majority of the existing literature focuses on estimating incentive
payments for environmentally sound production or land use practices. Few examples included
the studies on land conservation (Amigues et al., 2002); forest and habitat development (Kline et
al., 2000; Shaikh et al., 2007); water pollution reduction practices (Cooper, 1997; Brox et al.,
2003).
WTA produce valid estimates of individual’s true compensation required to encourage
adoption of environment friendly management practices (Goldar and Misra, 2001). Shaikh et al.
(2007) employed WTA measures to evaluate the compensation required by farmers in order to
convert marginal land into forest for carbon sequestration. The study found the lower value of
WTA as compared to the value obtained by another approach. Their study concluded that the
value elicitation using WTA benefits the government without hurting the utility of producers,
while setting up the incentive payments.
The WTA values elicited using a contingent valuation technique raises the issues of
hypothetical bias. Studies have focused on the appropriate approaches to deal with the
hypothetical bias under the field (Goldar and Misra, 2001) as well as experimental settings (Nape
et al. 2003). Under a field setting, Golder and Misra (2001) suggested using a functional form
that accommodates positive bias along with random error to obtain valid estimates for WTA.
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On the other hand, Nape et al. (2003) conducted an experiment to examine the presence
of hypothetical bias on WTA value. The study found significant presence of bias on hypothetical
market setting where individuals do not own the good in question. While the bias was not
significant if the individuals possessed the good in question before the experiment started (Nape
et al. 2003). Thus the result implied that the hypothetical bias is less if the concern is over a good
which an individual possesses. I closely followed their concept on setting up the hypothetical
market scenario (more will be discussed in the Method section) and involved a good in question
that the farmer possess. I reduce such bias by incorporating the farmers owned good (the broiler
production in which the individual’s livelihood is based) in the hypothetical market description.
The contingent valuation approach is often condemned for eliciting the values that fail to
represent the true WTP/WTA. In addition to hypothetical bias, zero bid value is very common
for contingent valuation studies either at open ended or payment card option (Bowker et al.
2003, Goodwin et al. 1993). Failure to accommodate zero and missing values produces sample
selection bias leading to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates.
Bowker et al. (2003) and Goodwin et al. (1993) treated zero bids as if the data was
censored at zero and employed a tobit model to estimate WTP bid function. However, under the
contingent valuation scenario, the zero responses are the result of non-observability rather than
the true censoring (where the censoring at zero may represent some negative values). In that
case, the use of a tobit model becomes inappropriate (Singelman and Zeng, 1999).
Strazzera et al. (2003) allowed the zero values by estimating the model in two stages. The
study employed a two-stage simultaneous equation model to correct for the bias caused by the
zero responses. Similarly, in response to the existing bias, Amigues et al. (2002) permits the zero
responses by estimating the model in two stages. The study found that the estimated hypothetical
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WTP value better represented the true willingness to pay amount when the zero responses were
treated separately in the model.
In general, the elicitation of a WTA value has been an accepted approach to assign
monetary values for nonmarket goods, if estimated using an appropriate methodology. Thus, this
chapter evaluates the WTA values that encourage broiler producers to participate in pollution
reduction programs through production termination. This section accommodates a heckman’s
sample selection model to allow bias.
III.

MODEL

Economic Model for WTA
Broiler production is assumed to be a component of an individual’s utility function as it
generates a portion or whole of their income and provides livelihood. Thus, terminating the
existing production practices directly affect the individual’s utility level. Therefore, a utility
theoretic approach is preferred to examine broiler producer’s preferences over current production
level or reduced production level with an additional income of WTA value.
The farmers are considered to have strictly quasiconcave utility function defined over a
quantity constrained good (flocks of broiler), a non-constrained good (numerarie) and money

income {. The { represents the individual’s household income consisted of farm as well as off-

farm incomes. A broiler producer’s utility function that accommodates an environmental

component, respondent’s socioeconomic characteristic and payment option is expressed as;
|}

| ~, { $  } , } 

(4.1)

| } · defines a broiler producer preferences over market goods and water quality improvement

through reduction in litter production (measured by reduction in production size). ~ is a vector of
variables containing farmer’s as well as farm characteristics and  } represents the WTA amount
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under the proposed policy.  } takes the value of zero under the current condition since there has
been no effort made to reduce pollution production, thus no changes in income is required. }

represents the water quality which is assumed to be directly affected by production termination.

The broiler producers are now expected to maximize their utility function | } with respect

to a constrained budget. However, the individual is faced with the two options, whether to
produce at the current scale or terminate the production practices with $I as an incentive

payment. The reduced broiler production is expected to reduce nutrient pollution production and
help to obtain better water quality (/ ).
The utility maximizing individuals desires to receive an incentive level that leaves

him/her at least better off as he was before the change on production. Suppose, |/

|~, { $ / , /  represents the utility level with new production level and positive income

change assuming T

1, while the utility level will be | 

production level or at current state of production.

| ~, {,   with no change in

Then an individual will be willing to terminate the production process if the following holds;
|~, { $ / , /   |~, {,  

(4.2)

Hanneman (1984) suggested that the individual’s utility functions should be treated as random

variables. Based on Hanneman’s argument, the |/ and |  are random utility function that can be
expressed respectively as;

P ~, { $ / , /  $  / and P ~, {,   $  

(4.3)

P · in equation 4.3 represents the deterministic component and the   and  / represent the

random error of a respondent’s utility function. P· is defined as individual’s indirect utility

function either after production termination with an / increase in income, or under the existing
production practices. It is assumed that the individual then evaluates their utilities at both
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conditions and decide whether to terminate the production process at given payment of WTA
value (which is defined as / ).

The individual’s decision on whether he/she would participate in a production

termination program is observed with following probability distribution.
Q!+Q9

P ~, { $ / , /  $  /  P ~, {,   $  

    / " P ~, { $ / , /   P ~, {,  

(4.4)

The terms   and  / are assumed to be independently and identically distributed random errors.

Once the individual decides whether to participate in the production termination program, he/she
would decide the desired amount of incentive payment to terminate the production process.
Econometric Model for WTA
The survey collects information on WTA value from the individuals who are willing to
participate in the production termination program, the observation may be nonrandom. In
addition, the two responses, whether to participate in the program, and the value that the
individuals desire to receive so as to terminate the production process, are correlated. Since the
WTA values are observed only for the individuals who are interested to participate in the
pollution reduction program, the elicitation of WTA becomes non-random. A regression on nonrandomly selected samples produces inconsistent estimates of the parameters (Davidson and
Mackinnon, 1993). Thus, the design of the WTA elicitation on the survey questionnaire requires
an econometric modeling that fully accounts for the possible correlation between “Yes/No”
answer of the participation question and the size of the WTA amount. The information elicitation
design requires simultaneous explanation of participation decision and WTA function. Therefore,
a Heckman’s selection model is employed to examine farmers’ decision to participate and pay to
mitigate nutrient pollution.
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Let’s represent the decision to participate by a binary variable  for an individual . If

an individual records a positive WTA value on the survey question 
respondent state WTA value be zero then 

1 is assigned while, if

0 is assigned indicating that he/she is not willing

to participate in the proposed pollution reduction through production termination.

The variable  is the individuals’ stated value representing the amount of incentive

(WTA) that an individual would need to terminate one flock of broiler birds from his existing
production practices.





where 

~ 7 $ 

(4.5)

~ 7 $ 

(4.6)



1 if   0 
0 if  " 0

1,2, … … … ,

represents the number of individuals in the sample. ~ and ~

represent the sets of explanatory variables on binary response equation (4.5) and WTA equation
(4.6). There may be some overlap on variables on the vector ~ and ~ . The 7 and 7 are
the unknown parameter vectors.

The respondent chooses to state 

1 if the latent variable turns out to be positive.

Otherwise, the respondent chooses to answer no to the participation question (

0). The

explanatory variables (~ , ~ ) and the binary response variable,  are always observable
while the willingness to pay value,  , is observed only when 

1. This makes the error

terms  and  to be correlated. Thus,  ~0,1 and    / 

0
m  o ~ 0, ?




J
1

q .

(4.7)

 is the standard deviation of  and  is the correlation between  and  . A nonzero

correlation between the two equations is a result of dependence of  on the respondent’s stated
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WTA value ( ). The negative correlation between the  and  implies that the individuals

who are willing to participate in the production termination program demand smaller WTA as an
incentive. However, the  and  are independent of the explanatory variables (~ , ~ ).
Maximum Likelihood Estimator

The conditional probability density function of an individual that chooses to participate in
the production termination program is;
h |

6Φ~ 7 8@ 61  Φ~ 7 8/X@

If an individual accepts to participate in the production termination program, the probability
density function of the amount of WTA will be;
h  |

and

1, ~

@ M/|@ ,~ @ | ~ 
@ M/|~ 

 |~ ~~ 7 , 0 


~ 7 $  X0   ~ 7 $ 

0
where  is independent of ~ ,  ~0, 1  
X0 ,



1| , ~ 

0
Φ,6~ 7 $  X0   ~ 7 81  
X0 X//0 2

Now combining all these and taking log of the likelihood function we get the following log
likelihood function;
T 

1    log61  Φ~ 7 8 $  :log Φ £6~ 7 $  X0  

0
~ 7 81  
X0 X¤ ¥ $ log ¦ 6  ~ 7 / 8  log <
I

IV.

(4.8)

DATA

A hypothetical market scenario was developed in order to elicit farmers’ WTA value. The
respondents were given a scenario of proposed government regulations that require them to
terminate a portion of production processes in order to meet the water pollution reduction. Then,
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the respondents were asked how much they desire to receive as an incentive payment from the
government if they were to comply with the proposed regulation. It is assumed that the
individuals who answered the WTA questions positively are willing to cooperate with the
proposed program, while the individuals who either did not respond to that question or listed
zero as WTA values were assumed to be not interested in the program. Nearly 16% of the
respondents were non-participants. The approach is consistent with Brox et al. (2003), who
assume non-response as non-participants.
Dependent Variable for Participation Equation
In the first stage, the dependent variable represents whether an individual is interested to
participate in the production termination program. The variable is operationally defined as 1 if
the individual responded with a positive amount on WTA question and zero if otherwise.
Dependent Variable for the WTA Equation
WTA represented the amount that an individual is willing to accept as an incentive
payment in order to trade one flock of broiler birds. The amount is elicited in dollars per flock
that an individual would terminate the production so as to reduce nutrient pollution generation.
The average WTA amount was about 4,000 dollars per flock that represents an individual’s price
to reduce water pollution.
Explanatory Variables
The variables that entered the final model are selected based on economics reasoning as
well as on stepwise regression. A priori economic theory does not guide much about the
variables affecting the willingness to participate and pay. Therefore, a stepwise selection process
is employed along with economic reasoning to choose the final set of explanatory variables.
Table 4.1 presents the list of variables used in the model and the summary statistics.
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The Number of broilers represents the total number of broiler birds raised by an
individual producer in 2003. The numbers of broilers are divided by 100,000 for easier
computational purposes. A larger number of birds imply larger production size. The production
size is found to be positively related to the willingness to participate in environmentally friendly
farming practices (Shaikh et al., 2007).
Herd size showed positive effect on probability of participation in the dairy termination
program and negative effect on bid value (Gale, 1990) to terminate the dairy production.
Similarly, the farm size affected the decision to terminate crop production to enroll the land in
CRP, positively (Boisvert and Chad, 2005). Previous studies have also found that the larger the
farm size the greater the land retired from the crop production to reduce the adverse effect of
agricultural production on the environment (Lambert et al., 2007).
The variable off-farm income measured whether an individual broiler producer has an
additional income from non-farm activities. Having off-farm income implies additional income
and therefore financially secured, to seek for other options to comply with pollution regulation
rather than changing production level. The variable is often found to be significantly affecting
individuals’ decision to participate in environmentally friendly production practices.
Respondent’s off-farm income affected the decision to participate in environmentally sound
practices negatively (Gillespie et al., 2007).
Fraction of land owned by the broiler grower over total land operated is hypothesized to
be negatively related to the participation decision as indicated by Rahelizatovo, (2002). Having
more land allows broiler growers some flexibility on litter application with no or little restriction
on litter spreading amount and frequencies. Individuals therefore, tend not to seek for other
alternative solutions for water pollution control measures.
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Farmer’s own characteristics play a major role in the decision associated with production
termination to reduce water pollution. The variable Age provided mixed results in previous
studies. Age is positively associated with the likelihood of environmentally friendly dairy
production practices (Gillespie et al., 2007), while it is negatively related with production
termination to enroll land into CRP (Kalaitzandonakes and Monson, 1994; Konyar and Osborn,
1990). Young farmers are found to be more knowledgeable and more risk taking due to longer
planning horizons and therefore, are more likely to participate in agricultural practices that
reduce the negative impact on environment (Adesina and Zinnah, 1993).
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of explanatory variables
Std
Dev.

Variable

Mean

WTA value ($ per flock of birds)

3961.21 3664.18

Min

Max
0

18750

Number of broilers/100,000

4.706

3.020

0.18

19

Individual has off-farm income =1

0.324

0.471

0

1

Perception that government should pay
for water conservation, scale 1-5

3.292

1.378

1

5

If there are housing subdivision in nearby =1

0.108

0.313

0

1

Ownership of business; individual owner=1

0.726

0.449

0

1

Heard about BMP

0.811

0.394

0

1

53.284

12.184

25

79

Farm income up to 49,999

0.315

0.468

0

1

Farm income from 50,000 to 99,999

0.356

0.482

0

1

Farm income greater than 99,999

0.233

0.426

0

1

Willing to participate on the program=1

0.838

0.371

0

1

Percentage of land owned by the grower

86.092

27.320

0

100

Age of farmer at the time of survey
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Business ownership is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is individually or
family owned. Individually owned businesses are assumed to have solo power to make decisions.
The single ownership makes the individual decide easily but the variable may have either a
positive or negative effect on participation decision.
Housing in surroundings is a dummy variable representing whether residential
subdivisions are located nearby the broiler farm. Deterioration of air quality from the broiler
litter is one of the major pollution issues associated with broiler production. Complaints of strong
and objectionable odors have been voiced by the neighbors causing serious legal actions against
broiler producers (http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/anafobmp.html#Odors; 20th May, 2008). Such
threat from the nearby residents forces broiler producers to implement appropriate measures to
reduce the smell problem. Presence of housing subdivisions in the neighborhood is therefore
assumed to have a significant positive effect on likelihood of participation in pollution
production termination decision. The variable may have either positive or negative effect on
WTA amount.
The producers hesitate to accept that their production practices possess a pollution threat
to the surface water as well as ground water. Therefore, the farmer’s perception about
government’s role in pollution control is an important factor to decide whether to participate in
the pollution control program through private effort of production termination (Hite et al., 2002).
In order to capture that effect, a scale of individuals’ perception toward government role (1 being
strongly disagreed and 5 being strongly agreed) is employed. The perception that the government
should pay for water pollution control programs is treated as continuous which is consistent with
the approach employed by Brox et al. (2003). The perception is hypothesized to affect the
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participation decision negatively. In addition, the WTA amount to trade a flock is assumed to
increase, if the producers don’t see their production practices as a threat to the water resources.
Awareness about the alternative practices was constructed by employing a dummy
variable to indicate whether an individual has heard about BMP. This represents whether the
respondent has only heard about the BMP or has implemented the practices. The variable is then
used as proxy for his/her general knowledge about the availability of alternative practices that
can be implemented to reduce nutrient runoff. Thus, the availability of substitutes is assumed to
have a negative effect on production termination.
Farm income is defined as the household income generated from the broiler industry.
Based on the existing literature, it is not clear what effect the farm income has on the willingness
to participate in a production termination program to secure better environmental quality. Farm
income showed negative effect in accepting to participate on production termination to develop
forest land (Shaikh, et al, 2007).
In this study, farm income is defined in five categories at the interval of $50,000 starting
from “negative profit up to $50,000”, “$0 to $49’999”, “$50,000 to $99,999”, “$100,000 to
$149,999” and “greater than or equal to $150,000.” Producers with higher farm income are
financially more secure as compared to others and are less interested in forgoing the production
to reduce water pollution. The individuals with high farm income may spend on pollution
abatement technology instead of termination of ongoing production practices. In addition, the
farmer who generates more farm income expects higher incentive payment if he has to forgo his
production to reduce nutrient generation.
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V.

RESULT AND DISSCUSSION

The data show that nearly 16% of respondents are willing to accept zero amounts in order
to participate in the production termination program. The zero bid response is common for
contingent valuation studies (Bowker et al., 2003; Goodwin et al., 1993). However, observing
zero bid values in WTA to trade a flock with cleaner water quality may not imply that the
respondents are willing to sell a flock of birds at zero prices.13
It is therefore assumed that the zero value originates from first stage of decision where an
individual decides whether/not to participate in the pollution reduction program (Strazzera et al.,
2003, Cho, et al., 2005). Then, at the second stage, the individual decides how much he/she
requires as incentive payments to forgo their production practices. Thus, the respondents having
zero bid values on contingent valuation questions are considered to be not interested in

terminating the broiler production to reduce pollution generation. The term  is then considered

to be unity if an individual responded positively to the WTA question and zero otherwise.

The WTA amount is observed only if the individuals are interested in participating in the

program or if the   0. For the contingent valuation question the  represents the dollar

amount that an individual desires to receive so as to terminate one flock of birds for better water
quality. The average value of WTA is about $3,960 whereas the profit from one flock is $1,400
the latter of which is estimated by the Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station.
The selection nature of data collection gives rise to an estimation problem since the errors
in the two decision process (participation and WTA value) are correlated. Excluding the nonparticipants from the analysis, or using only the positive WTA values produces an inconsistent
estimation of parameters (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
13

The exact format of WTA question as asked in the survey favors running a random effect probit model.
However, respondents provided only a limited number of choices. Lack of variation was the main reason to
abandon a RE probit model.
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Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggest employing a heckman’s selection model using
two-step estimation process in order to test the hypotheses of a no selection bias. The hypothesis
of “absence of selection bias” can be tested by checking whether the coefficient of inverse mills
ratio is significantly different than zero. The result indicates that the coefficient is significantly
different from zero at 10% level of significance. Since, the null hypothesis of “no sample
selection effect” is rejected, the ordinary least square (OLS) process produces biased and
inconsistent parameter estimates for WTA (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Baum, 2006).
With the rejection of sample selection hypothesis, and the nature of sample selection
process in data collection, I used heckman’s sample selection models for the analysis. It is
recommended to employ maximum likelihood estimation of sample selection models (Davidson
and MacKinnon, 1993) once the hypothesis of selection bias is rejected using two-step
procedure.
A priori economic theory fails to provide enough guidance to decide which variable
should be included either in participation or on WTA equation. Since, it is unlikely that the
individual’s decision to participate and his WTA amount are determined by the different sets of
covariates, a variable selection model is also employed. The selection starts from the full set of
variables. The variables significant at 0.30 were allowed in the Heckman sample selection
model. In addition, the demographic variables that failed to generate the Z values of at least one
were simultaneously dropped from the model. The process is consistent with variable selection
process employed by Brox et al. (2003). In addition, the variables that were selected in the
selection process but didn’t meet the convergence criteria at maximum likelihood estimation
approach were also dropped from the model. At the end of the variable selection trial, farm
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income, broiler number, housing in nearby, asset liability ratio and age were kept for the first
stage probit model. The results from the final model are presented on tables 4.2 and 4.3.
Table 4.2 provides the parameter estimates and their standard errors associated with the
binary choice of participation decision. The first step of the analysis estimated the decision
equation of whether to participate (or not to participate) on the proposed pollutant reduction
program. The only variables that came out to be insignificant, on the first step probit regression,
are farm size measured by broiler number and the dummy representing whether there is/are
housing subdivision/s near the broiler farm.
Turning to the specific determinants of WTA value (Table 4.3) that motivates the
individuals to participate on the program, it is noticed that production size, farm and off-farm
income, individual’s perception about government’s role in water pollution, ownerships of farm,
and knowledge about alternative pollution control programs are the significant factors affecting
stated willingness to accept value. In fact almost all of the variables are significant at least at ten
percent level of significance. The only variables that are not significant are the dummies for
income level that falls between 50,000 to 99,999; existence of housing subdivisions in the
surrounding areas and the age of principal operator at the time of survey.
The off-farm income is often found to be a significant variable in an individual’s decision
to participate in environmentally friendly production practices. This study also showed that the
participation decision is negatively affected by the level of off-farm income. Lambart et al.
(2007) also found the off-farm income is negatively associated with production termination
decision. An individual, who has off-farm income, is less likely to participate in the conservation
reserve program (Lambert et al., 2007) by terminating their production practices. Further,
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Gillespie et al. (2007) find a negative impact of individuals having off-farm income on
implementing pollutant reducing agricultural practices.
The fraction of land owned over total land operated for agriculture was hypothesized to
be negatively related to the participation decision as indicated by Rahelizatovo (2002). The result
supported the hypothesis showing that a one percentage point increase in the fraction of owned
land decreases the likelihood of participation in flock trading for pollution control program by
0.07. The individuals, who own a larger fraction of total operated land, are more flexible on
spreading litter on their own crop and pasture land. Excess nutrients from broiler litter become a
problem only if there are not enough crops and pasture lands to absorb the plant nutrient from
applied litter. If a farmer owns enough land to absorb nutrient content from all the litter produced
from broiler production, there is no need to terminate the broiler production. Therefore, the
individuals who own a larger percentage of land tend not to participate in pollutant reduction
programs through production termination.
Further, the result indicated that the older individuals are less likely to participate in the
production termination to help reduce pollution production. The result is contradictory to the
assumption that older individuals are near to the retirement and would be attracted by the
concept of production termination. On the other hand, it is also true that older farmers have less
flexibility in finding a job after terminating the ongoing farming operation. The older farmers
have shorter time horizon for recouping the profession change, it is more likely for farmers to be
less attracted toward terminating broiler production. The existing studies related to farmers’
behavior to cope with pollution reducing programs also suggest that older farmers are less
cooperative to the programs designed for achieving better environment (Gilespie, et al., 2007;
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Kalaitzandonakes and Monson, 1994). The result implies that the older farmers prefer not to
modify the production practices with the tools that are designed for long term goals.
Table 4.2: The determinants of willingness to participate: binary variable §¨

WTA value ($)

Coefficient

Std. Err.

0.158

0.109

Individual has off-farm income =1

-1.212**

0.635

Percentage of land owned by the grower

-0.066**

0.029

-1.011

0.635

-0.614**

0.266

0.106

1.291

-0.094***

0.036

-1.369**

0.615

14.532***

4.821

Number of broilers/100000

Ownership of business; individual owner =1
Perception that government should pay for water
conservation in the scale of 1-5
If there are housing subdivision in nearby =1
Age of farmer at the time of survey
Heard about BMP
Constant
Pseudo R-square

0.419

LR chi2(8)

25.54

Prob > w©0
Note:

*

,

**

0.001
and

***

represents the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.

The result showed that the perception among producers believe that government should
pay farmers in order to encourage pollution reduction efforts and reduces the likelihood of
farmers’ participation. The individuals who strongly believe that government should pay for
water pollution control programs are less likely to participate in the production termination
program to mitigate water pollution problems. The result is supported by the finding of Hite et
al. (2002) who found that the producers don’t accept their production practices possess a
pollution threat to the environment and should bear a responsibility for cleaning up. In addition,
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the WTA amount to trade a flock for better water quality increases, if the producers don’t see
their production practices as a threat to the water resources. The result showed a significant
positive impact of the perception on stated WTA value.
The proxy for an individual’s knowledge (heard about BMP) about the availability of
alternative practices showed negative effect on the likelihood of production termination. An
individual who has heard about the BMP is less likely to participate in the proposed production
termination program (Table 4.2) as compared to the ones who are not. Further, these individuals
stated greater value to the willingness to accept the amount to trade one flock of broiler (4.3).
The result implied that if the individuals who are aware of other alternatives (such as BMP) to
reduce pollution tend not to participate in the production termination program and also state a
greater amount of WTA.
The number of broiler raised in a year, which represented the size of the production is
found to be an important variable to determine the level of incentive payment that an individual
expects to receive. The result showed that the size of production is negatively related to the
stated value of WTA (Table 4.3) and positively related to the likelihood of participation (Table
4.2). The result implies that the larger broiler producers are more likely to participate in the
program and need lower incentive payments if they were to forgo their production practices
either partially or fully to meet the pollution reduction goal.
The finding is consistent with Lambart et al. (2007) who find larger farmers have more
flexibility with respect to land use decision. Therefore, they are willing to retire a larger portion
of land from crop production. Production size was also found to be negatively affecting the
incentive amount to enroll production land into the CRP program (Boisvert and Chang, 2005)
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and positively affecting the likelihood of participation on CRP enrollment (Boisvert and Chang,
2005; McLean-Meynsse et al. 1994) and pollution reduction programs (Rahelizatovo, 2002).
Table 4.3: The determinants of WTA: Sample selection and no-selection models for (ª¨ )
Variables

OLS selection

OLS no-selection

Coefficient.

Std. Error

-274.557**

125.480

-192.035

138.061

Individual has off-farm income =1

2694.798***

878.997

1699.734

1156.593

Perception that government should pay for
water conservation in the scale of 1-5

1058.141***

298.298

729.680**

337.543

507.206

1219.757

-732.914

1298.205

Ownership of business; individual owner=1

1575.931**

815.770

1608.133*

909.450

Heard about BMP

1992.005**

1039.751 2805.682***

1083.750

Number of broilers/100000

If there are housing subdivision in nearby
=1

Age of farmer at the time of survey

Coefficient

Std. Error

-20.677

33.751

-53.384

40.207

3469.184***

1408.545

3789.173**

1778.140

1737.143

1398.063

1530.968

1437.255

Farm income greater than 99,999

2643.502*

1452.289

2354.555*

1473.871

Constant

-2681.595

2832.887

-822.357

3645.072

1228.824

1036.837

----

----

0.474

0.418

----

----

2589.440

257.116

----

----

Farm income upto 49,999
Farm income upto 50,000 to 99,999







No of observations

70

Censored

11

Uncensored

59

0
Wald w/

/,«¬
Note:

67

50.55***
2.34**

, ** and *** represents the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
 is significant at 0.069

*
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In general, the result implies that the larger farmers are more responsive to the water
pollution issues and potential government regulations to mitigate the nutrient pollution problem.
Specifically, in the present context, the result may imply that the larger farmers fear from the
potential government regulation (for example, CAFO affects the larger producers more than the
smaller producers) and therefore, like to decrease the flock size at lower WTA value so as to
avoid dealing with the regulations.
There are four income dummies in the regression model. The first level stated whether
the firm is running at a loss and is employed as a reference group. The result showed that the
individuals earning less than $50,000 net farm income desire a higher amount of WTA value as
compared to the individual who face up to $50,000 loss per year. The third level of farm income
also showed significant positive impact on WTA value. The producers who earn up to $50,000
farm income per year require about $3,470 per flock per year in order to terminate the production
program as compared to the individuals who bear loss up to $50,000. The farmers with more
than $100,000 farm profit also showed significant positive impact on stated value of WTA.
Surprisingly, the second level of income category showed insignificant impact on stated value of
WTA. It may be that these groups of farmers are indifferent between participating and
nonparticipating as they are comfortable with their level of production and the income from the
production.

The , which represents the cross equation correlation, is positive. The result indicates

that individuals are interested to terminate their production practices only if they receive a

sufficient amount of incentive payment. The positive effect of perception that government should
pay for water pollution control programs also supports this finding. The positive correlation is
also consistent with the finding of Hite et al. (2002) who conclude farmers don’t agree their
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production practices contribute to nutrient pollution and hesitate to invest in pollution reduction
practices. However, Brox et al. (2003) found a negative relationship between the decision to
participate in pollution reduction program and stated WTA value.
In general the maximum likelihood approach is preferred to the two-step procedure for
the sample selection model because of the non-identification and collinearity problem in twostep procedure. Identification problem of Heckman two-step procedure originates from the
inclusion of inverse mill’s ratio in second step estimation. It is also argued that the imprecision
of the heckman’s two-step estimation originates from severe collinearity originated from
inclusion of inverse mills ratio (Leung and Yu, 1996; Wooldridge, 2002).
The two-step approach of heckman’s selection model may not perform well when the
selection equation (participation) and output equation (WTA) are highly correlated (Leung and
Yu, 2000; Nawata, 1994). For the diagnosis of collinearity, the inverse mills ratio obtained from
the first step probit selection model is regressed against explanatory variables on the WTA
equation (Nelson, 1984; Leung and Yu, 1996). The R-square value from this regression is used
to measure the magnitude of collinearity. The result showed the value of R square to form
auxiliary regression to be 0.433 is the evidence of collinearity supporting the use of the
maximum likelihood estimation (Leung and Yu, 1996). The regression of the inverse mills ratio
on all explanatory variables and correlation matrix are presented in Appendix C.
Even though maximum likelihood estimation approach is preferred the analysis is also
conducted using two-step procedure, because of following two reasons.
1. In a small sample, the maximum likelihood estimates tend to have larger parameter
bias than those of two-step approach (Leung and Yu, 1996).
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2.

Hypothetical bias is a serious problem in contingent valuation studies. In presence of
errors on measuring the dependent variable, MLE produces inconsistent estimates. On
the other hand, using two-step procedures, the errors due to the hypothetical bias is
absorbed into the disturbance term of the output (WTA) equation. Thus, the two-step
procedure may provide better parameter estimates (Stapleton and Young, 1984) as
compared to maximum likelihood estimates.

The results from the two step model produced similar conclusion while the standard
errors are larger for some of the variables. The result from the two-step procedure is presented in
Appendix C.
Expected value of WTA is estimated using the parameter estimates obtained from
Heckman’s MLE approach. The model estimated the broiler farmers’ WTA value to terminate
the production process to be $4,720 with standard deviation of $2,659. The average net income
from one flock of broiler production is listed to be only $1,400. The fixed cost associated with
broiler houses and other fixed assets that can’t be used for other production purposes might be
the main reason to overestimate the cost of production termination.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This study provides an insight over the factors to be considered before setting up the
incentive payments which encourages broiler producers to terminate production practice.
Establishing the appropriate baseline incentive payment is important to avoid unintended
negative consequences of governmental incentive payments. The factors that affect broiler
producer’s decision to cooperate with water pollution reduction programs are evaluated using
Heckman’s sample selection model.
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Size of the farm, measured by the number of broiler birds raised per year, significantly
affected the size of WTA value. Larger farmers are more serious about water pollution and
potential regulation and thus state a lower WTA values to help reduce water pollution. On the
other hand, the significant positive effect of perception that government should pay farmers to
participate in pollution abatement programs suggested that a sufficient economic incentive is
required to encourage farmers to participate in environmentally friendly production practices.
This study will be novel in the area of environmental economics in the sense that it
incorporated the farmers’ attitude toward nutrient pollution reduction programs. However, past
studies mainly focused on WTA for conservation programs. This analysis is also important
because a very little is known about the broiler producers’ attitude and willingness to participate
in the pollution reduction programs. And the understandings of the factors that affect farmer’s
interest to participate on those programs are critical for the success of national and state level
policy formulation in order to mitigate water pollution.
One of the strongest assumptions made in this chapter is that the individuals who have
listed their WTA as zero value are assumed as non participants. This assumption carries a valid
argument that the goods in question is flock of broiler birds and it is unconvincing that broiler
producer would terminate production of a flock at zero price. In addition, with the small size of
the dataset in hand and fear of losing valid statistical information, I decided not to drop the
observations with zero value on WTA question.
The lack of response commonly originates from protest votes; incomplete information to
the producers etc. Further, with the smaller sample size, the maximum likelihood estimates may
produce biased parameter estimates than those obtained from two step estimation process.
Therefore, the estimates from two-step estimation approach are also presented in Appendix C,
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however the conclusion drawn is not different from that obtained using maximum likelihood
method.
This study focuses on whether broiler producers are willing to participate on production
termination program to mitigate water pollution and what would be the incentive level that
suffices to encourage farmers to participate in the programs. However, this study does not focus
in the magnitude of pollution reduction from the level of production termination. The question of
how many flocks should be cut off to achieve desired level of water quality is determined by the
target of water quality requirement in a given watershed, which is beyond the scope of this study.
While using this result one should be cautious about the level of incentive payment on the
unintended effect of larger incentive on production termination. Studies have also indicated
larger incentive payments may produce unwarranted negative effect on production termination.
VII.
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CHAPTER FIVE
BROILER PRODUCERS’ WILLINGNESS TO PAY TO REDUCE WATER
POLLUTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) and
Environmental Quality Incentive Programs (EQIP) encourage farmers to participate in pollution
control programs. The NRCS/USDA provides technical and/or financial support to help
implement environmentally friendly production practices. Besides voluntary adoption of
environmentally friendly practices, broiler producers also face regulations for Concentrated
Animal Feeding Operations (CAFO) and Animal Feeding Operations (AFO) which require them
to follow pollution control measures and restrict the level of pollution. The common goal of
these policy instruments and regulations is to bring polluters on pollution reduction processes.
The current environmental policy encourages farmers to implement pollution control practices
voluntarily unless the farmers are CAFOs or AFOs.
It is widely accepted that the economic incentives/disincentives play a major role in
encouraging producers to participate in environmentally benign production practices (Tarui and
Polasky, 2005). In this chapter, I examined the level of economic disincentives that encourage
(force) farmers to internalize the pollution control measures into their production practices. I
assessed the concept of disincentives for polluters to enforce pollution control efforts on
polluters’ production decision. For the purpose, I estimated the maximum dollar amount that can
be charged as pollution abatement cost for an individual allowing him/her to be indifferent from
existing utility level. The amount is represented by the individual’s willing to pay (WTP) value
for pollution control/abatement measures and continue his production practices at the current
scale.
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It is well established that the amount representing the producer’s affordability or
willingness to pay to control water pollution becomes difficult to derive through market
transactions. Therefore, I employed a contingent valuation approach to examine the affordability
(or willingness to pay for water pollution control measures) of Louisiana broiler producers based
on their household income; their perception about the need of environmental regulations; and
other farm level characteristics.
The broiler producer’s desired willingness to pay level can be evaluated through a clear
understanding of their utility function. The contingent valuation approach elicits the amount that
the individual would be willing to pay and remains on his/her existing utility level. Using
contingent valuation approach, I created a hypothetical scenario of potential governmental
regulation that can be implemented if the broiler producers fail to accommodate environmentally
friendly production practices. Afterward, I obtained the individual’s bid amount for controlling
water pollution. It is assumed that the individuals’ stated WTP value will be an appropriate
approximation of disincentive/tax payment that can be imposed to internalize pollution control
effort into producers cost function.
II.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The continuous and evolving nature of environmental regulations and its adverse effect
on profit level forces farmers to search for alternative solutions to mitigate increased water
pollution. Increased number of regulated CAFO/AFO operations and strengthened permit
requirements (EPA, 2003) for these operations are the examples of government being more
stringent on water quality regulations. Meantime, the BMP adoptions and obeying the CAFO and
AFO regulations are the examples of farmers being more concerned about the regulation and

91

standards. Thus, the perceived threat of stringent regulation convinced the producers to
implement environmentally friendly production practices with no/partial amount of cost-share.
Large scale producers falling under CAFO and some AFO operations are forced to
employ environmentally benign production practices to comply with the permit requirements
(EPA, 2003). Even though the increased number of regulated CAFO and AFO showed
ambiguous results on reducing water pollution (Mullen and Center, 2004) the producers are
required to abide by these regulations. In order to avoid the potential punishment, agricultural
producers attempt to invest on environmentally friendly practices. This implies that the farmers
are willing to pay (forced to pay) some amount in order to avoid potential harsh governmental
regulations (to reduce water pollution) and continue the existing production practices.
The question remains how much the broiler producer will be willing/ able to afford to
reduce water pollution. The contingent valuation approach (WTP) measure has been employed in
a wide variety of research where non-market goods are involved (Urama and Hodge, 2006;
Whitehead, 2006; Cho et al. 2005; Strazzera, et al. 2003; Hudson and Hite, 2003; Hite et al.,
2002; Roach, et al., 2002; Whitehead et al., 2001; Stevens et al., 2000; Loomis et al. 1998;
Hanemann, 1984).
The approach has also been employed to elicit an individual’s willingness to pay amount
for water quality improvements (Whitehead, 2006; Brox et al. 2003; Hite et al. 2002; Whitehead,
2002; Cooper 1997). Whitehead (2006) examined the WTP value for water quality improvement
from the consumer’s point of view accommodating heterogeneity due to perceived water quality
levels. On the other hand, Hite et al. (2002) evaluated the value of water quality improvement,
from the producers’ point of view.
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The CV technique is based on the assumption that the maximum amount of money that
an individual desires to pay represents their maximum WTP value for the purpose of controlling
water pollution. Hite et al. (2002) found that the producer’s marginal willingness to pay for
pollution reduction decreased with an increased level of desired pollution reduction. According
to Hite et al. (2002) the decrease in marginal WTP is due to the fact that the agricultural
producers tend not to believe their production practices contribute enough to cause water
pollution problems. In addition, the authors state that the level of direct benefit received from
water quality improvements also affected the amount of stated WTP by farmers.
It can be argued that the producers are motivated enough (either due to regulation threat
or voluntarily) to pay for pollution control measures. Then, the contingent valuation approach
becomes a relevant tool to extract the actual amount that an individual farmer is willing to pay to
avoid harsh environmental regulations. For a non-market commodity like water pollution, this
approach is a satisfactory technique to elicit the present value of a proposed policy even though
Hoen and Randall (1987) assert that the approach as “not a flawless approach”.
The main concern with the contingent valuation approach becomes the development and
framing of the questionnaire. The contingent valuation questions usually follow dichotomous
choice responses where individuals are asked whether to vote (yes/no) for the proposed bid
options (Herriges and Shogren, 1996). The dichotomous choice questions are found to be
suffering from the anchoring effect (Herrisen and Shogren, 1996) drawing invalid conclusion.
With the anchoring effect in consideration, multiple bound questions gained popularity in
the recent years (Welsh and Poe, 1998; Alberini, et al. 2003). The multiple bound questions
provide a list of bid amounts from where a respondent chooses to represent his WTP value.
Some authors argue that providing a list of alternative bids reduces the focus of respondents on
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single bid or sequential bids and therefore reduces the anchoring effect (Whitehead, 2002; Roach
and Boyle, 2002; Rowe et al., 1996. In addition, literature also established that the double and
multiple bound questioning approaches increase the efficiency of parameter estimates
(Whitehead 2002; Alberini et al. 2003).
In double and multiple bound questions, given the dichotomous type response, logit or
probit models have mostly been used in contingent valuation studies (Whitehead et al., 2001).
Alberini et al. (2003) used a random effect logit model to estimate the WTP value from the
multiple bound contingent valuation technique. The main goal of the study however, was to
understand questionnaire design rather than estimating the expected value of WTP for openwater fishing.
Brox et al. (2003) estimated willingness to pay to improve water quality and allowed a
non-response bias in the model. The respondent’s WTP value was elicited using the payment
card approach and heckman’s two step model was employed to correct the observed sample
selection bias. Urama and Hodge (2006) estimated WTP for mitigating soil and water
degradation problems focusing on the effect of education on WTP values.
Similarly, Whitehead (2002) employed random effect probit models on double, triple and
multiple bound questions. The precision of WTP value increased with multiple bond questions in
the contingent valuation approach (Whitehead, 2002). Whitehead focused that the double bound
questionnaire format provided better estimates for true WTP when a starting value of an
individual’s bid is difficult to assign to represent the distribution of WTP values. Roach et al.
(2002) also claimed an increased efficiency in parameter estimates with multiple bound
questionnaire setting.
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Along the vein of Whitehead (2002), providing starting value of WTP to the broiler
producers while eliciting WTP becomes relatively difficult since no guideline exists to suggest
potential value that an individual would be willing to pay. Due to such facts and also because of
the anchoring effect in a single bound question, a multiple bound question format was found to
be attractive in this study.
III.

MODEL

Economic Model for WTP

A rational broiler producer  is expected to choose a combination of market goods  and

water pollution control measures to maximize utility given a limited budget {. A simple utility
function that accommodates an environmental component, the respondent’s demographic
characteristics, net income, as well as a payment vehicle defines the broiler producers’
preferences over market goods and environmental quality. Given the utility framework, an
individual’s utility function is explained by;
|}

| ~, {   } , } 

(5.1)

The { represents the individual’s household income, which includes farm as well as off

farm income net of existing tax. ~ represents a vector of variables describing the characteristic of

individuals as well as their farm.  } is the change in tax under the proposed water pollution

reduction policy and } represent of water quality level under current condition or proposed

policy.

Hanemann (1984) developed a utility theoretical framework to derive WTP and WTA
from a dichotomous choice discrete response in contingent valuation studies. Based on

Hanemann’s argument, let’s assume two possible levels of water quality represented by T
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0, 1. T

0 represents an initial or the existing level of water quality whereas, and T

represents the level of improved water quality.

1

At the status quo of no water pollution reduction effort, the broiler producers receive

utility | 

|~, {,  . For water quality at the the current conditions since no changes in

payment are required, the  } becomes zero. Accordingly, for proposed policy, a change in net
income is expected which changes the utility function as |/

|~, {   / , / . This

represents the broiler producer’s utility function with improved water quality and change in net
income through change in tax ( / ).
Hanemann (1984) argues that an individual know his/her utility function while it is
unknown to the researchers. Therefore, an individual’s utility function is consisted of empirically
measureable component P · and stochastic econometric error  } . Thus, individuals’ standard

utility functions with (equation 5.2) and without (equation 5.3) proposed change are expressed
as;

|/

|

P ~, {   / , /  $  /

(5.2)

P ~, {,   $  

(5.3)

It is assumed that broiler producers compare the utilities under current (equation 5.3) and

proposed water quality and net income scenario (equation 5.2). The underlying reasoning of the
individual’s choice of whether to maintain status quo of no water pollution or undertake a water
pollution control measures to improve water quality is based on the following condition;
P ~, {   / , /  $  /  P~, {,   $  

(5.4)

The model implies that an individual compares the proposed improvement on water
quality and change in net income, with current condition, and evaluates the difference on utilities
under both of the plans. It is assumed that the individual then decides whether to pay or how
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much to pay for the proposed program so as to keep the utility level unchanged (negligibly
changed). The difference in utility under current and proposed conditions can be expressed as;
%|

P~, {   / , /  $  /  P ~, {,   $  

P ~, {   / , /   P ~, {,        / 
%      / 

(5.5)

Where the errors   and  / are assumed to be identically and independently distributed with zero
means.

Econometric Models for WTP
a)

Ordered Response Model

It is assumed that the broiler producers compare the proposed water quality improvement
with the existing water quality. They, then assess the difference in utility from the two water
quality levels. The individual producers then define their utility difference in terms of WTP.
Based on this criterion, an individual respondent decides the amount of dollars that he/she is
willing to pay.
The broiler producers are given three payments intervals (less than $300; $300-$500; and
greater than $500) and asked where their WTP value falls. Suppose the payment levels are

represented by an ordinal scale ®. If the respondents’ WTP value is below $300 then ® takes a

value of 1; if the utility difference falls within $300 and $500, ® is 2; and if the WTP value is
greater than $500 then ® takes the value of 3. The data allows estimation of parameters using
probit models (Boccaletti and Nardella, 2001; Jin et al., 2008).

For econometric purpose, the latent value of WTP takes the three values as follows
(Johnston, 1999; Jin et al., 2008);
WTP

1

if WTP " q/
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2

WTP

if q/ # WTP " q0

3

WTP

if WTP  q0

(5.6)

Where q represents unobserved threshold parameters that outline the interval where utility

difference falls and the WTP represents the utility difference. The qO determines the boundary

where the value of WTP map into the given differences in utility (Davidson, 1993).
Let the WTP is defined by;
WTP

~ 7

~ 7 $ 

(5.7)

5 $ 5/ °V°±°UUT $ 50 UTTQV9 $ 5² Uhh U³9 $ 5´ QV9 $ 5« T9!TQ %
$ 5¬ U Q $ 5µ +9!9+U

Where, the stochastic error ¶ is assumed to have standard normal distribution with mean zero

and variance of one. The errors are assumed to be independent and identically distributed. The 7
represents a vector of parameters to be estimated and ~ represents a vector of individual as well
as farm characteristics.

Now based on the equations 5.2 to 5.7 the probability that the utility difference falls in a
given interval of WTP value is expressed as;
WTP

1

WTP # q/ 

~ 7 $  # q/ 

  # q/  ~ 7
Φq/  ~ 7

Similarly, the probability that ·
WTP

2

2 is;

q/ " WTP # q0 

 q/ " ~ 7 $  # q0 

  # q0  ~ 7    # q/  ~ 7
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Φq0  ~ 7  Φq/  ~ 7

And the probability that ·
WTP

3

3 is;

WTP  q0 

~ 7 $   q0 

   q0  ~ 7
Φ~ 7  q0 

(5.8)

where,  is probability operator. Provided all these probability density functions for  , the
unknown model parameters can be estimated by maximizing the following log likelihood
function;

ℓ q/ q0 , 7

∑WTP@ M/ log6Φq/  ~ 78 $ ∑WTP@ M0 log 6Φq0  ~ 7  Φq/ 

~ 78 $ ∑WTP@ M² logxΦD~  7  q0 Fz

(5.9)

The effects of changes in explanatory variables on the probability of WTP falling in a
given range are not explained by the estimated coefficients (Greene, 2008) in case of probit/logit
models. It is therefore, the effects of explanatory variables are expressed in terms of marginal
effects which can be derived as follows;
¸WTPM/|¹
¸¹

¸WTPM0|¹
¸¹

¸WTPM²|¹
¸¹

¦~ 77

¦~ 7  ¦q  ~ 77
¦q  ~ 77

(5.10)

The marginal effect is the slope of curve that relates an explanatory variable to

WTP

®|º controlling the effects of other variables (Long, 1997).

99

b)

Interval Regression Model

The boiler producer’s WTP value in this study is coded by an interval where an

individual’s latent value · falls. The upper and lower limits of the interval are known to the

respondent as well as to the researcher. Such data collection approach replaces the unknown q by
known cell limits, Q/ and Q0 and define WTP as in equation 5.11. Wooldridge (2002) suggests

an interval regression to estimate  ·  |º when the upper and lower limits of the intervals are

known (Whitehead et al., 2001; Doorslaer and Jones, 2003). Instead of estimating 7 and q as in
ordered logit/probit model, the interval regression estimates the parameters 7 and  0 , where
0

PQ!WTP |º. The model assumes ·  |º~Normalº7,  0  instead of standard normal for

probit and logistic for logit regressions.

The likelihood function given in equation 5.9 changes into the following form when the
upper and lower limits of the interval are known.
ℓ 7,  0 

∑WTP@ M/ log mΦ :

∑WTP@ M² log mΦ :

º¨ 7 X »¤
½¤

<o

»I – º¨ 7
½¤

<o $ ∑WTP@ M0 log mΦ :

»¤ – º¨ 7
½¤

<Φ:

»I – º¨ 7
½¤

<o $

(5.11)
IV.

DATA

The third section of the data provide three bid categories where broiler producer’s
willingness to pay values falls. The multiple bound questionnaire setting seems appropriate in
this context at least for the following two reasons;
•

The tendency of yea saying to the given value even though the true WTP is
less/greater than the provided can be reduced (Roach et al. 2002),

•

The double and multiple bounded dichotomous choice models provide better
parameter estimates than the single bounded model (Whitehead, 2002; Hanemann, et
al. 1991).
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The individuals’ chosen WTP is assumed to represent the amount that the broiler
producers were willing to pay if the money would be implemented on pollution abatement. The
amount is elicited in dollars per flock. The amount per flock is asked as there is too much asset
specificity in broiler production and an integrator makes decision on whether to put more birds
or not after each flock based on the performance of broiler producers (Vukina and
Leegomonchai, 2006).
Explanatory Variables
It is assumed that individuals gain utility both from water quality improvements as well
as from his/her net income. The observable characteristics that have positive/negative impact on
an individual’s preferences for water quality control measures include socioeconomic as well as
farm characteristics.
Farmer’s demographic characteristics play a major role in the decision associated with
water pollution and environmentally friendly production practices. Based on previous studies,
respondent’s Age is one of the important factors to impact the WTP decision (Hanemann, 1991).
The age measures the producer’s age at the time of data collection and is found to have mixed
effect.
Koundouri et al. (2006) found the age of the respondent affected the willingness to invest
on producing better environment quality, negatively. Younger farmers were more knowledgeable
and more risk taking due to a longer planning horizon and therefore, were more likely to
participate in environmentally friendly agricultural practices in a study conducted by Adesina
and Zinnah (1993). The argument is also supported by Brox et al. (2003).
Level of education and contact with extension agents are employed to capture the effect
of information effect on WTP value. The producers who have better information on issues and
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importance of water quality through education are more likely to contribute toward
environmental practices (Koundouri et al., 2006). As Hite et al (2002) suggested that farmers
have propensity not to believe their existing production practices contribute to a water pollution
problem. Therefore, the education through school or through contact with extension agents
becomes crucial factors determining the level of WTP value. Education is measured in three
categorical variables (high school or lower, college, and graduate degree) represented by two
dummy variables in the regression model.
In addition the farmers who have visited extension agents and talked about farmer’s
contribution to water pollution are more likely to contribute to water pollution control measures.
Exposition of individual producers to the extension services is believed to generate awareness
about ongoing nutrient pollution issues in the local areas. The variable is assumed to have
positive effect on WTP value. Contact with extension agents was constructed using the
information obtained indicating whether an individual has visited the extension agents in last
year. The variable is then used as proxy for his/her general contact with the extension service
providers.
The respondents were also asked about their perception regarding the necessity of water
pollution control measures or regulations. Individuals’ responses are recorded using a Likert
scale, where five represents an individual strongly agrees with the statement “water pollution
control measures and regulation are badly needed”. Brox et al. (2003) also measured the
perception about existing water quality on a WTP study using the Likert scale and treated as a
continuous variable. The perception about existing water quality significantly increased the
willingness to pay on their study. Similarly, the broiler producers who believed the water
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pollution control measures and regulations are badly needed are assumed to state higher WTP
value.
Farmers’ off-farm income represents whether the principal operator (owner) of a broiler
farm has income from other jobs except from broiler production. The individuals who have offfarm income are not constrained to remain on the business by paying an extra amount for water
pollution control. Therefore, the individuals with off-farm income are believed to pay a lower
amount as compared to the ones who solely depend on broiler production to generate household
income. Gillespie et al. (2007) finds the farmers with off-farm income are less responsive to
water pollution control measures.
Land available to litter application represents the total acreage available to spread the
broiler litter on individual’s land. Smaller area to litter application implies higher nutrient
concentration and runoff to the surface water or transportation litter. In order to avoid a fear of
governmental regulations and the problems associated with litter transportation; these producers
are likely to pay more in the form of pollution abatement tax. Therefore the variable is assumed
to be negatively related to the WTP amount.
V.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Producer’s WTP function is estimated using ordered probit and interval regression
approaches. A summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis are presented in table 5.1.
Nearly 69 percent of the farmers hold only a high school degree. About 24 percent were college
degree holders and only 7% of the broiler producers have graduate level education. Similarly,
about 32% of the broiler farmers had off farm income. More than 60% of the farmers had contact
with extension agents in previous year. On an average, 46% of the total land is used to spread
broiler litter.
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Table 5. 1: Summary statistics for the variables used
Std.
Variables

Mean

Dev

Min

Max

High school degree =1

0.689

0.466

0

1

College degree =1

0.243

0.432

0

1

Graduate degree =1

0.068

0.253

0

1

Individual has off farm income =1

0.324

0.471

0

1

Age of farmer at the time of survey

53.284

12.184

25

79

Percentage of total land, where litter is usually applied

0.460

0.489

0 3.125

Individual has contact with extension agents

0.608

0.492

0

1

Perception that "Water pollution control measure is badly
needed" in the scale of 1-5

3.775

1.124

1

5

Table 5.2 presents the estimated coefficients and their standard errors obtained from
maximizing the two equations at 5.9 and 5.11. The model significance and the R square values
are also presented at the end of table 5.2. Table 5.3 presents the marginal effects along with their
standard errors. The ordered probit model is significant at 0.069 percent. Socioeconomic or the
demographic variables such as age, education, and incomes are included in the model in order to
capture the variability in individual-specific characteristics.
Most of the demographic variables are significant with expected signs, while the
perception of an individual regarding the water quality regulations shows no effect on WTP
amount. The perception about existing water quality showed no significant effect on willingness
to pay to improve minor water quality problems in a study conducted by Brox, et al. (2003).
However, the same study showed a significant effect of the perception on WTP value, while the
proposed policy addressed major water quality problems.
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Table 5.2: Parameter estimates using ordered response models on stated WTP range14
Ordered probit Interval regression
Independent Variables

Coefficients

Coefficients

College degree = 1

1.024**
(0.455)

98.228**
(43.829)

Graduate degree = 1

1.248**
(0.518)

133.624**
(58.375)

Individual has off farm income =1

-1.005**
(0.500)

-90.939***
(36.179)

Age of farmer at the time of survey

0.043**

3.484**

(0.020)

(1.451)

Percentage of total land, where litter is usually applied

-0.771
(0.553)

-53.945*
(30.455)

Individual has contact with extension agents

0.231
(0.363)

18.124
(35.654)

-0.075
(0.149)

-0.921
(16.073)

Perception that "Water pollution control measures are
badly needed" scale of 1-5
constant

86.943
(115.019)

q/

2.443
(1.323)

q0

3.816
(1.329)

Number of observations

59

59

Pseudo R square

0.217

0.203

Prob. > F

0.069

0.0001

Note:

*

, ** and *** represents the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
The numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.

14

Due to small sample and significant number of missing observation in each category j, the model became
inestimable when “Respondent’s income” was allowed in the model.
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The insignificant effect of water quality perception and the need of regulation originate
from the fact that the agricultural producers fail to realize their production practices contribute
enough to cause a water pollution problem (Hite et al. 2002). Thus, the producers’ WTP value
may not be affected by the perception of water quality if the producers perceive water quality
problems as minor (Brox, et al., 2003).
It is assumed that farmers with higher education are knowledgeable about the negative
impact of water pollution on human health as well as on the natural ecosystem (Urama and
Dodge, 2006). Therefore, the educated producers are more responsive to water pollution control
measures. As expected the result indicated the individuals with higher education tend to pay
greater amounts for water pollution control measures as compared with individuals having less
than a high-school degree. Both dummy variables for education; the college degree and graduate
degree, are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 percent level of significance.
The marginal effects (table 5.3) of education levels show a negative effect on the first
level of WTP, while it is positive for higher WTP values (level 2 and 3). Thus, the individuals
who hold either a college or higher degree are willing to pay more for water control measures
than those with only a high-school degree at most. For individuals with graduate degree, the
probability of paying <300 decreases by 0.465, however, probability of paying $300-500 and
>$500 increases by 0.285 and 0.180 respectively (However, the variable is significant at 0.16 for
WTP value >$500).
Individual farmers who have off-farm income significantly increases the probability of
paying less dollars (<$300) for pollution control measures. At the same time, having off-farm
income decreases the probability of paying higher WTP. The result showed that the probability
of choosing WTP less than $300 is 0.280 greater for individuals with off-farm income as
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compared to the ones without off-farm income. In contrary, the probability of stating WTP in
between $300 and $500 is 0.239 lower for individuals with off-farm income as compared to the
ones without the off-farm income.
Table 5.3: Marginal effects of ordered probit models on stated WTP ranges
Marginal Effects
Mean
Variables

P(WTP=1) P(WTP=2) P(WTP=3)

College degree =1

-0.366**
(0.155)

0.271**
(0.117)

0.095
(0.068)

0.254

Graduate degree =1

-0.465***
(0.176)

0.285***
(0.104)

0.180
(0.124)

0.068

Individual has off farm income =1

0.280***
(0.102)

-0.239***
(0.096)

-0.041
(0.027)

0.305

Age of farmer at the time of survey

-0.014**
(0.006)

0.012***
(0.006)

0.251
(0.169)

-0.210
(0.151)

-0.041
(0.033)

0.464

-0.074
(0.115)

0.062
(0.096)

0.012
(0.020)

0.627

0.024
(0.049)

-0.020
(0.042)

-0.004
(0.008)

3.746

Percentage of total land, where litter is
usually applied
Individual has contact with extension agents
Perception that "Water pollution is badly
needed" in the scale of 1-5
Note:

0.002 52.966
(0.002)

*

, ** and *** represents the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
The numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.

Age is an important variable contributing toward WTP decision (Brox, et al., 2003). Age
is positively associated with the likelihood of environmentally friendly management practices
(Gillespie et al., 2007). At the same time, it is also found that the older individuals tend to spend
less on water pollution control measures (Brox, et al., 2003). The result of this study showed age
is significantly and negatively associated with the choice of less than $300 as their WTP value.
However, the probability of paying a larger amount (WTP in between $300 and $500) for water
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quality control measure increases with age. A ten year increase in respondent’s age increases the
probability of paying in between $300 and $500 by 0.12 and decreases the probability of paying
less than $300 by 0.14. Thus, older individuals are willing to spend more on water quality
control measures, similar to the finding of Gillespie et al. (2007). The result showed individuals
who have contacted the extension agent in the past year tend to pay more for water pollution
control measures. However, the estimated parameter is not statistically significant.
As the WTP value on data represented an interval where the true WTP falls, an interval
regression was also employed (Whitehead, et al. 2001). The interval regression is similar to the
ordered logit model when the threshold values are known to the researchers. The conclusion
using interval regression is not different from that using the ordered probit model. All the
variables significant on the ordered probit model are also significant on interval regression
model. Additionally, the parameters have the same signs in both models.
The effects of variables are interpreted as in case of ordinary regression. An individual
with a graduate degree pays about $98 more than the counterpart with only high-school degree.
Similarly, one year older broiler producers pay $3.48 more to control nutrient pollution control
measure.
Employing the ordered logit model for WTP, the threshold parameters are not allowed to
vary depending on the respondent’s farm as well as individual characteristics. Effectively,
separate equations are run for each of the WTP categories with the assumption that the slope
parameters are same among the equations but not the intercepts. With this parallel regression
assumption, the estimated coefficients are similar in each equation.
However, the assumption may not be unrealistic if the stated WTP varies based on the
explanatory variables. The estimated parameters may lead to incorrect, incomplete and
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misleading results (Williams, 2006). A Wald test for the parallel regression assumption is used in
order to examine whether the slope coefficients differ for each category of stated WTP.
Table 5.4: Coefficient estimates using generalized ordered probit model
Coefficients

Coefficients

P(WTP=1)

P(WTP=2)

1.087**
(0.478)

1.087**
(0.478)

1.440***
(0.522)

1.440***
(0.522)

Individual has off farm income =1

-0.949*
(0.530)

-0.949**
(0.530)

Age of farmer at the time of survey

0.035*
(0.020)

0.035**
(0.020)

-0.933*
(0.576)

-0.933*
(0.576)

0.106
(0.379)

0.106
(0.379)

-0.199
(0.163)

0.960*
(0.570)

-1.492
(1.375)

-7.844***
(2.762)

Variables
College degree =1

Graduate degree

Percentage of total land, where litter is
usually applied

Individual has contact with extension agents
Perception that "Water pollution is badly
needed" in the scale of 1-5

constant

Number of observations

59

Pseudo R square

0.28

Wald w 0 (Prob. > w 0 )

Note:

*

**

18.66(0.016)

***

, and represents the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
The numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.

The Wald test statistics (Chi square with 6 df = 19.57) was significant indicating
violation of the parallel regression assumption. Further analysis detected that the perception
about the need for environmental regulation violated the assumption. Therefore, a generalized
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ordered probit model is employed to relax the parallel regression assumption only for the
perception variable. The estimated coefficients and their standard errors obtained generalized
ordered logit are presented in Table 5.4.
Now, the perception variable is allowed to have different effects on different categories
of stated WTP values. The result showed that individuals’ perception significantly and positively
affected the likelihood of paying higher amounts ($300 to $500) for water pollution control and
decreased the probability of paying less (< $300). However, the effect of the perception is not
statistically significant for the WTP category < $700
Table 5.5: Marginal effects estimated from the generalized ordered probit model
Marginal Effects
Variables

P(WTP=1)

P(WTP =2)

P(WTP =3)

College degree =1

-0.386***
(0.160)

0.356***
(0.140)

0.030
(0.048)

Graduate degree

-0.528***
(0.163)

0.438***
(0.154)

0.090
(0.098)

Individual has off farm income =1

0.263***
(0.109)

-0.255**
(0.109)

-0.008
(0.013)

Age of farmer at the time of survey

-0.011*
(0.006)

0.011*
(0.006)

0.000
(0.001)

0.301*
(0.172)

-0.290*
(0.170)

-0.011
(0.018)

-0.034
(0.120)

0.033
(0.116)

0.001
(0.005)

0.064
(0.054)

-0.075
(0.056)

0.011
(0.014)

Percentage of total land, where litter is usually
applied

Individual has contact with extension agents
Perception that "Water pollution is badly needed"
in the scale of 1-5

Note: * , ** and *** represents the significance level at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
The numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.
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In addition, the generalized ordered probit model showed the portion of land available for
litter spreading significantly affects the WTP value (the variable was not significant with ordered
probit specification). So, having a larger portion of land to spread broiler litter increases the
likelihood of a paying less for pollution abatement and decreases the probability of choosing to
pay higher amount ($300 to $500). The farmers spread broiler litter as fertilizer for crops
production, the crops demand for fertilizer may utilize a larger portion of poultry litter (if not all
produced by broiler production practices) and therefore less pollution runoff. The individuals
with a larger portion of land available for litter application believe the pollution runoff should
not be a problem for their land. Thus, their production practices doesn’t contribute enough
nutrient pollution to pollute the nearby water sources. Therefore, these farmers are less likely to
pay a larger amount for water quality control measures.
The mean WTP value was calculated using the parameter estimates from the interval
regression model. The estimated average WTP value that a broiler producer would like to pay in
order to control water pollution is $260.955.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The broiler production is operated by farmers where the integrators provide chicks and
feed to the producers and the producers raise chicks to marketable weight. The farmers are paid
based on performance which depends on production efficiency and the integrators take the
responsibility of marketing final product. However, none of the beneficiaries takes the
responsibility of litter management to reduce excess nutrient flow. Such fact forces the
government to regulate the broiler production in order to reduce the inverse effect of meat
production on environment. In fact the broiler production is under a threat of stringent
government regulation (MacDonald, 2008) which, Segerson and Miceli (1998) believe, is
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important to protect the environmental quality. Therefore, the concept of punishing/charging
CAFOs and AFO if it fails to meet the desired level of pollution abatement efforts seems
important to mitigate nutrient pollution contributed by broiler producers.
The question of “how much” and “what should be considered” before setting up a
standard payment level, remains vague. In this study, I evaluated the concept of providing
negative incentives for polluters to enforce pollution control efforts on their production decision.
A contingent valuation approach is employed to examine the affordability (or willingness to
spend on water pollution control measures) of the farmers based on socioeconomic as well as
farm level information. Result indicated that the broiler producers are willing to pay about $260
per flock per year as pollution abatement cost. This compares to almost 20% of their net profit
from broiler production per flock in Louisiana.
The value will be useful at the policy level to understand the amount that a farmer is
willing to pay/bear for pollution control measures above which an incentive level can be fixed to
enforce environmentally friendly production practices. This will reduce the adverse effect of
higher incentive payment on production practices. For example, larger incentive payments
provided to help reduce pollution may divert producers’ interest from production toward
receiving subsidy. This will also reduce the government expenditure on incentive payments.
Thus, the policy instruments such as a pollution abatement tax that are levied beyond the
farmers, WTP value may reduce cost to the government and unintended effect of incentive
payment on production decision.
One drawback in this study is the failure of the ordered logit model to estimate the dollar
amount that an individual can afford to reduce the negative impact of his/her production
practices. The returned survey did not produce enough observations to use an individual’s dollar
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value of WTP. Therefore, WTP value is measured using intervals where the individual’s true
values may fall. As this study is based on farmers’ value of the better environment, lack of
complete information about the negative effects of pollution on the health and ecosystem and
enough knowledge about the proposed tax policy may have resulted into failing to provide the
exact amount of WTP value.
VII.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
The large volume of litter produced by confined broiler production forces excessive use
of broiler litter on available crop and pasture land producing adverse effects on human as well as
the ecosystem. The negative economic incentives associated with litter transportation and litter
management forces broiler producers to intensify the repetitive application exacerbating the
nutrient accumulation and runoff.
The broiler producers in Louisiana fail to accommodate pollution reduction effort on their
production decision mainly due to the byproduct nature of pollution production and externality
nature of water pollution. In addition, the producers fail to realize their production process
contributes enough nutrient pollution to nearby water-bodies. The producers thus, hesitate to
contribute toward the pollution control programs (Hite, et al. 2002; Poe et al., 2003). Thus, the
issue of how to best manage agricultural nutrient runoff becomes an important concern mainly
among policy makers.
Economists advocate the economic tool is the most cost effective approach to mitigate
the harmful effects of nonpoint source pollution (Freeman, 2003). Accordingly, my dissertation
evaluated economic aspects of three litter management options to reduce nutrient pollution
originated from broiler productions. Lyon and Maxwell (2002) support the presumption that
voluntary adoption of environmentally friendly production practices is socially beneficial as
compared to others. However, the adoptions of such practices (BMP) have been very slow,
questioning the effectiveness of the voluntary effort to mitigate water pollution.
The first chapter of this dissertation evaluated the factors contributing to the slow
diffusion of the voluntarily adopted BMPs. It is true that the adoption of a single BMP may
suffice to reduce water pollution and may not require another approach for some farms. For
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others, using a BMP may not reduce pollution production to desired levels and require other
practices to be adopted as the complements. An implementation of a second practice thus
depends on the characteristics of previously adopted practices and level of pollution reduction
from the first one. These characteristics of BMP adoptions require an in-depth understanding of
the effect of previously adopted practices before intending to adopt another one. The result of
this study also supports the argument by showing an existence of dependence among multiple
BMP adoptions.
On evaluating the factors supporting/hindering the adoption of BMPs, this study found a
significant correlation among the multiple BMPs adopted by an individual. Therefore the
conditional frailty model that allows for such correlation is employed to obtain consistent and
efficient parameter estimates in the presence of event dependence and shared individual
characteristics. The result from first chapter showed a presence of individual level heterogeneity
and /or correlation among multiple BMP adoptions. The larger variance of the random effect
parameter either originated from event dependence or individual specific characteristics shared
among the adoptions by an individual producer. Therefore, the study also implies that a deep
understanding of how the adoption of a BMP affects the adoption of another BMP while
designing policy tools and strategies to encourage voluntary/mandatory BMP adoptions.
The adoption of BMPs in Louisiana shows an initial stage of “S” shaped pattern of
technology adoption where the number of adoption significantly increased after the year 1992.
As the theory of technology transfer suggests, the rate of BMP adoption increased once the
producers became more informative about the BMPs, either through neighbors, extension
educations or through the advertisement. The result supports the argument showing that the more
informed farmers, through school education and/or contact with extension agents, adopt BMPs
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faster than their counterparts. Thus, farmers’ education through extension services and the
programs such as master farmer programs become important factors to be considered in order to
increase the rate of BMP adoptions.
At the same time, the existing studies claim that the voluntary practices are effective only
if implemented as complementary to other pollution reduction approaches such as environmental
regulation or standards. This requires a search for other alternative pollution reduction
mechanisms in order to obtain desired level of pollution reduction. In this regards, this
dissertation evaluated two other economic tools to enforce broiler producers to participate on the
pollution reduction goals. The fourth and fifth chapter evaluated the factors associated with
farmers’ desire to participate in pollution reduction programs.
The forth chapter focused on whether the broiler producers are willing to participate on
production termination program to mitigate water pollution and what would be the incentive
level that suffices to encourage farmers to participate in the programs. It assumes that the
nutrient pollution can be reduced through terminating broiler production either full or partially.
From the policy perspective, it provides an insight over the factors to be considered before
setting up incentive payments that encourage broiler producers to cooperate with pollution
reduction goal.
This study finds that the size of the farm, significantly affects the size of incentive
payment, represented by the willingness to accept (WTA) value, desired by the broiler producers.
The larger farmers are more serious about water pollution and potential regulations and thus state
a lower WTA values to help reduce water pollution. Larger farmers are also found to be early
adopters of BMPs and are willing to participate on production termination programs. This
implies that the larger farmers are willing to cooperate with pollution reduction program. Larger
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farmer are more responsive to water pollution regulation may be due to the fact that the CAFO
and AFO regulations are harsh on the large farms and therefore, farmers like to avoid the
consequence of dealing with the harsh environmental/governmental regulations.
On the other hand, the significant positive effect of perception that government should
pay farmers to participate in pollution abatement programs suggested that a sufficient economic
incentive is required to encourage farmers to participate in environmentally friendly production
practices. Individuals with larger crop and pasture land to spread litter are less likely to terminate
the production. In addition the analysis of willingness to pay study in chapter five showed that
the individuals with larger crop and pasture land are willing to pay less for pollution control
effort. Therefore, for these individuals, adopting BMP may become the low cost pollution
control option.
Further, contact with extension agents and education are found to have positive effect on
cooperating with the pollution reduction programs. Chapter three shows contact with extension
agents increases the likelihood of adopting BMPs earlier than their counterpart; chapter five
showed these individuals pay more dollars to improve water quality. The chapter four showed
individual who know about the alternative approaches of pollution reduction are less likely to
terminate the broiler production. This result suggests that the farmers are reluctant to terminate
the production if alternative approaches are available. Chapter three that the farmers near to the
age of retirement are hesitant to adopt BMPs. However, the older farmers are likely to pay more
for water pollution control measures. Thus, the study implies that policy tools that require
farmers to pay for pollution reduction are more effective with the older farmers.
Chapter four and five will be novel in the area of environmental economics in the sense
that it incorporates the farmers’ attitude toward nutrient pollution reduction programs.
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Establishing the appropriate baseline incentive payment based on the farmers’ anticipated
amount to receive and pay to mitigate water pollution avoids the unintended negative
consequences of governmental incentive payments. The estimated WTP and WTA values will
serve as add-on to setting up incentive payments either as direct subsidy for producer to reduce
the litter production through curtailing the broiler production or through paying pollution
abatement cost. In addition, the incentive payments can also be established to enhance the BMP
adoptions. Thus, the second section of this dissertation carries more weight when it comes to
policy implication on setting up the incentive levels to encourage pollution reduction efforts.
These chapters are important because very little is known about the broiler producers’ attitude
and willingness to participate in the pollution reduction programs. And the understandings of the
factors that affect farmer’s interest to participate in those programs are critical for the success of
national and state level policy formulation in order to mitigate water pollution.
The third chapter will be novel in the area of BMP adoption as it allows the correlation
among the multiple adoptions while evaluating the dissemination of pollution abatement best
management practices. In fact, the adoptions of multiple BMPs are common in practice and the
adoptions are interconnected with one another and tools that accounts for the interconnection
among BMPs should be employed to examine the diffusion process of BMP to reduce nutrient
pollution. The analytical process carries more weight because the process can be replicated to
examine any kind of technology adoption to improve the profit level of farming operations.
This study does not provide insight into the magnitude of pollution reduction through the
implementation of BMPs or through production termination. The questions such as how much
pollution can be reduced by implementing a specific BMP is not addressed in this dissertation.
Also, the question of how many flocks should be cut off to achieve desired level of water quality
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is determined by the target water quality requirement in a given watershed, which is beyond the
scope of this study. While using the estimated value of WTA representing incentive that the
farmers need, one should be cautious about unintended effects of larger incentive on production
termination. Examining the amount that the individuals are willing to pay (WTP) for reducing
water pollution, this study suggests that the incentive payments can be established beyond the
WTP. Doing so reduces the cost of pollution control for the government as well as the
unintended adverse effect of larger incentive payments to the society and the environments.
The main shortcoming of this dissertation is the limited number of observation. Since the
data was provided for the analysis, improving the response rate or the number of observation
become outside the scope of this study. It should also be noticed that the standard errors of the
estimated parameters are based on the small sample therefore, one should be cautious about the
interpretation of the exact estimates. However, the methodology applied in this dissertation is
well suited and can be applied in the similar studies in other fields.
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APPENDIX A: TREND IN MEAT CONSUMPTION

Trends in Meat Consumption
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Figure A1: Trend in Meat Consumption Over Ninety Five years
Data Source: http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FoodConsumption/spreadsheets
/mtpcc.xls#carcass!a1
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APPENDIX B: PROPORTIONAL HAZARD RESIDUAL PLOTS AND TESTS
The probability of chi-square value is larger than 0.05 which implies that the proportional
hazard assumption holds for each variable.

Table B1: Test of proportional-hazards assumption
Variables

rho

chi2

Prob>chi2

Broiler numbers

0.18352

1.53

0.2154

Experience

0.35913

5.93

0.0149

Education

-0.11799

0.57

0.4494

Age

0.09061

0.28

0.5973

Farm income

0.24339

1.92

0.166

Contd. after
retirement
Ownership

-0.09532

0.53

0.4685

0.19337

1.05

0.3057

Policy

-0.08272

0.3

0.5826

Contact with
extension agents
Global test

-0.02069

0.02

0.9019

13.34

0.1478
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The scaled schoenfeld residual are plotted to examine the assumption of Cox proportional
hazard model. Few of them are listed on the following figure.

Figure B1: Residuals plots to check the whether the proportional hazard assumption hold
for each variable used in the model.
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Figure B2: Nelson Aalen cumulative hazard function for BMP adoption differentiated by
type of available BMPs
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Figure B3: Nelson Aalen cumulative hazard function for first BMP adoption for an
individual
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Figure B4: Nelson Aalen cumulative hazard function for second BMP adoption for an
individual
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Covariance Structure of Variance Corrected Models
The variance correction model are based on the following setting of covariance matrix: The
variance corrected models are based on robust standard errors which accounts for
interdependence across repeated or heterogeneous events. The regular variance-covariance
matrix is obtained by:
P

Á

Â0T =
Ã
Â5 0

The robust standard error is;
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And the cluster corrected standard error to allow for the heterogeneity can be stated as;
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Where V is number of clusters. ( is the contribution of individual  to the score function

evaluated at 5.
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Table B.2: Data setting for conditional frailty model
Serial no

event

Adoption yr

start

end

duration1

Event no

broilerno1

year

Experience

age

1

1

2000

0

46

46

1

500

15

5

25

1

0

2004

46

50

4

2

500

15

5

25

2

1

1998

0

14

14

1

600

20

20

50

2

0

2004

14

20

6

2

600

20

20

50

3

1

1994

0

15

15

1

384

10

25

64

3

0

2004

15

25

10

2

384

10

25

64

4

1

2002

0

2

2

1

750

12

4

52

4

0

2004

2

4

2

2

750

12

4

52

5

1

2003

0

2.5

2.5

1

500

30

14

48

5

0

2004

2.5

3.5

1

2

500

30

14

48

6

0

2004

0

4

4

1

657.6

35

4

42

7

0

2004

0

24

24

1

284.8

5

24

61

8

0

2004

0

30

30

1

240

0

30

63

9

0

2004

0

24

24

1

550

10

35

53

10

1

1996

0

2

2

1

595

0

10

64

10

0

2004

2

8

6

2

595

0

10

64

11

0

2004

0

6

6

1

800

25

9

32

12

1

1995

0

3

3

1

880

0

12

79
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APPENDIX C: HECKMANS SAMPLE SELECTION MODEL USIGN TWO-STEP
PROCEDURE AND RESULT
Two-step Estimator
Conditional expected value of  given 

 |
 ! 

1

R  ,
~ 7 $ ~ 7

1 is;

¦!/Φ!,

Where ! is a real number ranging over ∞, ∞ and ¦ and Φ represents the density and

distribution functions of the standard normal distribution, respectively. The expected value of
WTA, for an individual , is now expressed as follows, given that 
  |

1

R  F $  (4.9)
~ 7 $ D~ 7

1;

The Heckman’s two-step estimator is obtained based on equation 4.9. At the first stage, the

probit maximum likelihood approach is employed to estimate consistent estimates of 7 . The 7

R  . Then ordinary least square approach
is replaced by estimated maximum likelihood estimator 7
is used to estimate 7 .

At the first step, the model endogenizes the respondents’ participation decision to
estimate the probability of selection (participation). Then, at the second step, the estimated
probability (through mills ratio or cdf and pdf of the participation decision) is used while
estimating the expected value of WTA.
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Table C1: The determinants of willingness to participate: binary variable §¨
(Two step)
WTA seen

Coef.

Number of broilers/100000

Std. Err.
0.171

0.106

Individual has off-farm income =1

-1.290

0.576

Percentage of land owned by the grower

-0.066

0.029

Ownership of business; individual owner=1

-1.079

0.622

Perception that government should pay for water
conservation in the scale of 1-5

-0.559

0.249

0.222

1.233

-0.086

0.035

Heard about BMP

1.381

0.616

Constant

0.171

0.106

If there are housing subdivisions in nearby =1
Age of farmer at the time of survey

Wald chi2(8)

47.91

Prob > chi2

0.000
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Table C2:The determinants of WTA: The sample selection model for ª¨ (Two step)
Variables

Coefficients

Std. Errors

Number of broilers/100000

-241.124

133.348

Individual has off-farm income =1

2515.122

911.290

Perception that government should pay for water
conservation in the scale of 1-5

973.166

314.715

If there are housing subdivisions in nearby =1

562.233

1265.308

Ownership of business; individual owner=1

1453.298

851.696

Heard about BMP

2080.730

1067.652

-32.350

36.402

Farm income up to 49,999

3576.696

1372.426

Farm income up to 50,000 to 99,999

1876.217

1418.725

Farm income greater than 99,999

2814.687

1453.112

-2260.043

2928.690

2623.107

1440.103

Age of farmer at the time of survey

Constant




0.958



2738.576

Pseudo R-square

0.419

No of obs.

70
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Table C3: Regression of estimated inverse mills ratio to examine correlation
Variables

Coefficients
-0.040**

Std. Errors
0.0157

0.364***

0.097

Perception that government should pay for
water conservation in the scale of 1-5

0.121***

0.035

If there are housing subdivision in nearby
=1

0.156**

0.149

0.229

0.101

-0.174

0.121

0.017***

0.004

0.0428

0.175

0.028

0.170

0.124

0.177

-1.039***

0.346

Number of broilers/100000
Individual has off-farm income =1

Ownership of business; individual owner=1
Heard about BMP
Age of farmer at the time of survey
Farm income up to 49,999
Farm income up to 50,000 to 99,999
Farm income greater than 99,999
Constant
R-squared

0.433
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Table C4: Correlation table with inverse mills ratio
mill
bn
Off_inc
gov_pay
housing
owner
bmp
age
Inc50K
Inc100K
Inc more

mill

bn

1.00
-0.21
0.22
0.15
-0.01
0.16
-0.22
0.32
0.11
-0.06
0.03

1.00
0.04
0.22
0.11
0.05
0.05
-0.10
-0.16
-0.08
0.01

off_inc govt_pay housing owner

1.00
-0.12
-0.01
-0.16
0.09
-0.12
-0.02
-0.12
0.09

1.00
-0.11
0.20
0.01
-0.34
-0.03
-0.04
0.03

bmp

age inc50K

1.00
0.10 1.00
0.05 0.02 1.00
-0.10 -0.15 -0.23 1.00
-0.11 -0.09 -0.37 0.16
0.04 0.14 0.24 0.05
-0.07 -0.13 0.19 -0.85
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1.00
-0.50
-0.36

inc100K inc more

1.00
-0.42

1.00

APPENDIX D: DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLES USED
Table D1: Distribution of dependent variable
WTP categories

Freq. Percent

Cum.

WTP < 300

43

69.35 69.35

300< WTP < 500

15

24.19 93.55

500< WTP < 700

4

6.45

62

100

Total

136

100

Table D2: Education attained by respondents
Education level
Less than high school
College
Graduate
Total

Freq. Percent Cum.
51
68.92 68.92
18
24.32 93.24
5
6.76
100
74
100
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APPENDIX E: STATA PPROGRAM
APPENDIX E1: CODES USED IN CHAPTER THREE
clear
set more off
capture log close
set logtype text
*log using "C:\Documents and Settings\Ashish\My Documents\ndevko1$ on 'Agecserver1' (Z)\dissertation1\Adoption\analysis\stata\result_June4th.doc",
replace
insheet using "C:\Documents and Settings\Ashish\My Documents\ndevko1$ on
'Agec-server1' (Z)\dissertation1\Adoption\analysis\stata\
data_stata3.txt"
***

RUN THIS ONLY TO GET GRAPH OF ADOPTION OVER TIME
*keep if event ==1
*sort adoptionyr
*gen n=_n
*keep serialno adoptionyr n
*graph twoway line n adoptionyr

***

HOUSING
*********
replace q43_housing=. if q43_housing>1

***

POLICY
*********
gen policy1996=0
replace policy1996=1 if adoptionyr>1996
replace policy1996=. if adoptionyr==.

***

EDUCATION
**********
*list q43_educ if q43_educ==0
gen educ1=0 if q43_educ==1
replace educ1=0 if q43_educ==2
replace educ1=0 if q43_educ==3
replace educ1=1 if q43_educ==6
replace educ1=1 if q43_educ==4
replace educ1=0 if q43_educ==5
replace educ1=. if q43_educ==0
replace educ1=. if q43_educ==.

***

AGE
**********
*list q43_age if q43_age==0
replace q43_age=. if q43_age==0
replace q43_age=25 if q43_age==2.5
replace q43_age=. if q43_age==.

***

OWNERSHIP
**********
*list q43_ownership if q43_ownership==5
*list q43_ownership if q43_ownership==4
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gen q43_ownership1=1 if q43_ownership==0
replace q43_ownership1=1 if q43_ownership==1
replace q43_ownership1=1 if q43_ownership==2
replace q43_ownership1=2 if q43_ownership==3
replace q43_ownership=. if q43_ownership==5
replace q43_ownership=. if q43_ownership==4
replace q43_ownership=. if q43_ownership==.
***

MARITAL
**********
list q43_marital if q43_marital==0
gen q43_marital1=1 if q43_marital==3
replace q43_marital1=0 if q43_marital != 3
replace q43_marital1=. if q43_marital==0
replace q43_marital1=. if q43_marital==.

***

GENDER
**********
*list q43_gender if q43_gender==2
replace q43_gender=. if q43_gender==2

***

RACE **********
list q43_race if q43_race==0
gen q43_race1 =1 if q43_race ==4
replace q43_race1 =0 if q43_race !=4
replace q43_race1 =. if q43_race ==.

***

RETIRE
**********
*list q43_retire if q43_retire==1
gen q43_retire1=1 if q43_retire ==1
replace q43_retire1=0 if q43_retire==2
replace q43_retire1=0 if q43_retire==3
replace q43_retire1=. if q43_retire==0
replace q43_retire1=. if q43_retire==.

***

ASSET LIAB **********
*list q43_assetliab if q43_assetliab==6
replace q43_assetliab=. if q43_assetliab==0

***

PERCENTAGE OF INCOME FROM BROILER **********
replace q43_perfarminc=. if q43_perfarminc==0

****
***

FARM INCOME **********
there no 6 in the category
*list q43_farmincome if q43_farmincome==1
gen q43_farmincome1=0 if
replace q43_farmincome1=0
replace q43_farmincome1=1
replace q43_farmincome1=1
replace q43_farmincome1=1

q43_farmincome==5
if q43_farmincome==4
if q43_farmincome==3
if q43_farmincome==2
if q43_farmincome==1

replace q43_farmincome=. if q43_farmincome==0
replace q43_farmincome=. if q43_farmincome==.
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corr q2_broilerno1 q30_bmp q7_litterac q43_exper q43_age q43_educ
q43_gender q43_marital1 q43_race1 q43_farmincome1 q43_retire
q43_housing q43_ownership1 q43_assetliab policy1996
stset duration, failure(event)
stsum, by(bmp)
***

***

NELSON ALLEN CUMMULATIVE HAZARD FUNCTION
sts list,na
sts graph, na
id(serialno)

***
xi:

PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL
stcox q2_broilerno1 q43_exper i.educ1 i.q43_farmincome1 q43_retire1
q43_ownership1 policy1996 q44_contact, efron nolog tvc(q43_age)
stcox, nohr

***
xi:

CLUSTER CORRECTED MODEL
stcox q2_broilerno1 q43_exper i.educ1 i.q43_farmincome1 q43_retire1
q43_ownership1 policy1996 q44_contact, efron cluster(serialno) nolog
tvc(q43_age)
stcox, nohr

***
xi:

WLW MODEL
stcox q2_broilerno1 q43_exper i.educ1 i.q43_farmincome1 q43_retire1
q43_ownership1 policy1996 q44_contact, efron strata(bmp)
cluster(serialno) nolog tvc(q43_age)
stcox, nohr

***
xi:

SHARED FRAILTY MODEL
stcox q2_broilerno1 q43_exper i.educ1 i.q43_farmincome1 q43_retire1
q43_ownership1 policy1996 q44_contact, frailty(gamma) shared(serialno)
efron nolog tvc(q43_age)
stcox, nohr

***
xi:

TESTING ASSUMPTION OF COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD
stcox q2_broilerno1 q43_exper i.educ1 q43_age q43_farmincome1
q43_retire1 q43_ownership1 policy1996 q44_contact, efron nolog noshow
schoenfeld(sch*) scaledsch(sca*)
stphtest,
stphtest,
stphtest,
stphtest,
stphtest,
stphtest,
stphtest,
stphtest,
stphtest,
stphtest,
stphtest,

log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log
log

detail
plot(q2_broilerno1 ) yline(0)
plot(q43_exper ) yline(0)
plot(q43_age ) yline(0)
plot(_Ieduc1_ ) yline(0)
plot(q43_farmincome1 ) yline(0)
plot(q43_retire1 ) yline(0)
plot(q43_ownership1 ) yline(0)
plot(policy1996) yline(0)
plot(q44_contact) yline(0)
plot(q43_marital1 ) yline(0)
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R CODES FOR CONDITIONAL FRAILTY MODEL
library(survival)
data<-read.table("C:\\Documents and Settings\\Ashish\\My Documents\\ndevko1$
on 'Agec-server1' (Z)\\dissertation1\\Adoption\\analysis\\R\\data for
r21.txt", header = TRUE)
cond.frailty.gamma<-coxph(formula = Surv(start, end, event) ~ broilerno1 +
exper + age + educ1 + farmincome1 + retire1 + ownership1 + policy1996 +
contact + strata(eventno) + frailty.gamma(serialno), data = data)
beta.cond.f.gamma<- cond.frailty.gamma$coef
naivese.cond.f.gamma<- sqrt(diag(cond.frailty.gamma$var))
se.cond.f.gamma<-sqrt(diag(cond.frailty.gamma$var2))
loglike1.cond.f.gamma<-cond.frailty.gamma$loglik[[1]] #
loglike1.cond.f.gamma
loglike2.cond.f.gamma<-cond.frailty.gamma$loglik[[2]] #base
loglike2.cond.f.gamma
theta.cond.f.gamma<-cond.frailty.gamma$history[[1]]$theta
theta.cond.f.gamma
ll.cond.f.gamma<-cond.frailty.gamma$history[[1]]$c.loglik
ll.cond.f.gamma
summary(cond.frailty.gamma)
)
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APPENDIX E2: CODES USED IN CHAPTER FOUR
version 10.0
****************************************
**** HECKMAN 2 STEP PROCEDURE
****************************************
capture log close
set more off
insheet using "C:\Documents and Settings\Ashish\My Documents\ndevko1$ on
'Agec-server1' (Z)\dissertation1\WTP and WTA\analysis\WTP\data\
DATA_ORDLOGIT_SAS.txt", clear
log using "C:\Documents and Settings\Ashish\My Documents\ndevko1$ on 'Agecserver1' (Z)\dissertation1\WTP and WTA\analysis\WTA\
result_dec_30th_heckman_final.doc", replace text
****

DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR SELECTION MODEL

**********************

***

WHO ANSWERED ZERO TO THE WTA QUESTION ARE NON-PARTICIPATOR AND ARE
SELECTED OUT FROM THE WTA MODEL.

***

DUE TO OUTLIER THE UPPER END OF WTA IS TRUNCATED AT Q3+*2 INTERQUARTILE
RANGE;
replace wta=0 if q24_minwta==0 & q24_minwta!=.
gen wtaseen=1 if q24_minwta>0
replace wta=. if q24_minwta==.
replace wtaseen=0 if q24_minwta==0
replace wtaseen=0 if q24_minwta==.
list wtaseen q24_minwta wta

***

MARITAL STATUS

***
***
***
***

Q43_MARITAL: 1= SINGLE; 2=DIVORSED; 3=MARRIED; 4=WIDOWED
THERE ARE NO OBSERVATIONS ON 2
THERE ARE 5 INDIVIDUALS WITH 5 AND THESE ARE CODED AS 0

*************************

drop married
*list q43_marital if q43_marital==5
gen married=1 if q43_marital==3
replace married = 0 if q43_marital!=3
replace married = . if q43_marital==.
*list married q43_marital
***
***
***

SPOUCE-INCOME
**************************
Q43_SPOUCEINCOME=1 IF SPOUCE HAS INCOME ELSE 0
*list q43_spouceincome if q43_spouceincome==1

**********MARRIED*SPOUCEINCOME*********************
gen married_sincome=married*q43_spouceincome
*list married married_sincome q43_spouceincome
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**********
***
***
***

ASSET LIABILTIY

*******************

Q43_ASSETIAB: 1=NO DEBT; 2=1-20%; 3=21-40%; 4=41-60%; 5=>60%
THERE ARE 4 INDIVIDUALS THAT HAVE 0 AND ARE CODED AS 1
*list q43_assetliab if q43_assetliab==5
drop assetliab
gen assetliab=1 if q43_assetliab==0|q43_assetliab==1|q43_assetliab==2
replace assetliab=0 if
q43_assetliab==3|q43_assetliab==4|q43_assetliab==5
*list assetliab q43_assetliab

**********
***
***
***

OWNERSHIP

*************************

Q43_OWNERSHIP: 1=INDIVIDUAL; 2= FAMILY; 3=FATHER-SON; 4=OTHERS
THERE ARE NO OBSERVATIONS ON 3
THERE ARE 5 INDIVIDALS WITH 0 AND ARE CODED AS 1
*list q43_ownership if q43_ownership==3
gen ownership=1 if q43_ownership==0
replace ownership=1 if q43_ownership==1
replace ownership=0 if q43_ownership==2
replace ownership=0 if q43_ownership==4
replace ownership=0 if q43_ownership==3

*********
***
***

OFF_FARM INCOME

**************

Q43_OFFINCOME: 1= OWNER HAS OFF FARM INCOME TOO
*list q43_offincome if q43_offincome==1

***

Q43_FARMINCOME

***

Q43_FARMINCOME: 1= >100000 2=50000-99999; 3=0-49999; 4=LOSS <25000; 5=
LOSS 25000-50000; 6=LOSS>50000
THERE ARE NO OBS ON 6
3 AND 4 ARE CHNAGED TO ONE CATEGORY TO MAKE EQUAL INTERVAL

***
***
***

***************************

*list q43_farmincome if q43_farmincome==6
gen farm_income =1 if q43_farmincome==4 | q43_farmincome==5
replace farm_income =2 if q43_farmincome==3
replace farm_income=3 if q43_farmincome==2
replace farm_income =4 if q43_farmincome==1
*list farm_income q43_farmincome
***

Q43_EDUCATION

***

Q43_EDUC: 1= > H SCHOOL; 2= HIGHSCHOOL; 3=COLLEGE; 4=UNDERGRAD;
5=GRADUATE; 6= VOCATIONAL
THERE IS NO OBSERVATION ON 6

***
***

***************************

drop educ
*list q43_educ if q43_educ==6
gen educ =1 if q43_educ==1 | q43_educ==2
replace educ=2 if q43_educ==3 | q43_educ==4
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replace educ=3 if q43_educ==5
*list q43_educ educ
***

Q43_HOUSING
**************************
*list q43_housing if q43_housing==1

***

Q43_RETIRE
**************************
*list q43_retire if q43_retire==3

***
***
***

Q2_BROILERNO
**************************
NUMBER OF BROIER IN 100,000
gen bn=q2_broilerno/100000

***
***
***
***
***

Q43_PERS ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTIONS **********
pay = Q43_PERS11-15= GOVT SHOULD PAY FARMERS FOR WATER CONSERVATION
PRACTICES 5=STONGLY AGREEE
Q43_PERS16-20 = GOVT SHULDNOT BE INVOLVED IN AGRICULTURE 5=STONGLY
AGREEE
Q43_PERS21-25 = GOVT INVOLVED IN AG HELPS FARMERS 5=STONGLY AGREEE
THERE IS ONE OBS WITH GOVT_PAY==6 THAT IS CHAGNED T0 5
egen govt_pay = rowtotal(q43_pers11-q43_pers15)
replace govt_pay=5 if govt_pay==6
replace govt_pay =. if govt_pay==0
egen govt_inv=rowtotal(q43_pers16-q43_pers20)
replace govt_inv =. if govt_inv==0
egen govt_ag = rowtotal(q43_pers21-q43_pers25)
replace govt_ag=. if govt_ag==0

*************************************************
***
CORRELATION CHECK
xi:
corr wta wtaseen bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership
q30_bmp q43_age i.farm_income per_own ownership
***

VARIABLE SELECTION FOR WTASEEN FROM STEPWISE PROBIT
********************************************

xi: stepwise, pr(.30): probit wtaseen bn educ per_own per_littuse ownership
q30_bmp assetliab q43_age q43_firmage q43_offincome q43_housing
q44_contact q41_year q43_exper q40_plantosp govt_pay
***

SELECTED VARIABLES FOR WTASEEN FROM STEPWISE PROBIT
*bn q43_offincome per_own ownership govt_pay q43_age q30_bmp

***

VARIABLE SELECTION FOR WTA FROM STEPWISE REGRESSION

xi

:stepwise, pr(.30): reg wta bn educ per_own per_littuse ownership
q30_bmp assetliab q43_age q43_firmage q43_offincome q43_housing
q44_contact q41_year q43_exper q40_plantosp govt_pay i.farm_income

***

SELECTIED VARIABLES FOR WTA FROM STEPWISE REGRESSION
*bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp q43_age
i.farm_income

sum

wta bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp q43_age
farm_income
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***

HECKMAN'S SELECTION MODEL

***
xi:

SUMMARY STATISTICS
**********************
sum wta bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp
q43_age i.farm_income wtaseen per_own q41_year
corr mill bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp
q43_age i.farm_income

xi:

***
xi:

xi:

***
xi:

xi:

HECKMAN MODEL SAMPLE SELECTION MODEL (TWO STEP)
heckman wta bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp
q43_age i.farm_income, select(wtaseen =bn q43_offincome per_own
ownership govt_pay q43_housing q43_age q30_bmp) first twostep
mills(mill)
predict ycond, ycond
sum ycond
reg mill bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp
q43_age i.farm_income
vif
HECKMAN SAMPLE SELECTION MODEL (MLE)
heckman wta bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp
q43_age i.farm_income, select(wtaseen =bn q43_offincome per_own
ownership govt_pay q43_housing q43_age q30_bmp) first
predict ycond1, ycond
sum ycond1
reg wta bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp q43_age
i.farm_income, robust
predict xb
sum xb

***

OLS of wta

xi:

reg wta bn q43_offincome govt_pay q43_housing ownership q30_bmp q43_age
i.farm_income, robust
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APPENDIX E3: CODES USED IN CHAPTER FIVE
version 10.0
set more off
clear
capture log close
insheet using "C:\Documents and Settings\Ashish\My Documents\ndevko1$ on
'Agec-server1' (Z)\dissertation1\WTP and WTA\analysis\WTP\data\
DATA_ORDLOGIT_SAS.txt", clear
*log using "C:\Documents and Settings\Ashish\My Documents\ndevko1$ on 'Agecserver1' (Z)\dissertation1\WTP and WTA\analysis\WTP\
result_ologit_6TH_NOV.doc", replace text

***

***
***
***
***

MARITAL STATUS

************************

drop married
Q43_MARITAL: 1= SINGLE; 2=DIVORSED; 3=MARRIED; 4=WIDOWED
THERE ARE NO OBSERVATIONS ON 2
THERE ARE 5 INDIVIDUALS WITH 5 AND THESE ARE CODED AS 0

*list q43_marital if q43_marital==5
gen married=1 if q43_marital==3
replace married = 0 if q43_marital!=3
replace married = . if q43_marital==.
*list married q43_marital
***
***
***

SPOUCE-INCOME
**************************
Q43_SPOUCEINCOME=1 IF SPOUCE HAS INCOME ELSE 0
*list q43_spouceincome if q43_spouceincome==1

**********MARRIED*SPOUCEINCOME*****************************************
gen married_sincome=married*q43_spouceincome
*list married married_sincome q43_spouceincome
***

ASSET LIABILTIY

**************************

***
***
***

Q43_ASSETIAB: 1=NO DEBT; 2=1-20%; 3=21-40%; 4=41-60%; 5=>60%
THERE ARE 4 INDIVIDUALS THAT HAVE 0 AND ARE CODED AS 1
*list q43_assetliab if q43_assetliab==5
drop assetliab
gen assetliab=1 if q43_assetliab==0|q43_assetliab==1|q43_assetliab==2
replace assetliab=0 if
q43_assetliab==3|q43_assetliab==4|q43_assetliab==5
*list assetliab q43_assetliab

****

OWNERSHIP

*********************************

***
***

Q43_OWNERSHIP: 1=INDIVIDUAL; 2= FAMILY; 3=FATHER-SON; 4=OTHERS
THERE ARE NO OBSERVATIONS ON 3
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***

THERE ARE 5 INDIVIDALS WITH 0 AND ARE CODED AS 1
*list q43_ownership if q43_ownership==3
gen ownership=1 if q43_ownership==0
replace ownership=1 if q43_ownership==1
replace ownership=0 if q43_ownership==2
replace ownership=0 if q43_ownership==4
replace ownership=0 if q43_ownership==3

***

OFF_FARM INCOME

**********************

***
***

Q43_OFFINCOME: 1= OWNER HAS OFF FARM INCOME TOO
*list q43_offincome if q43_offincome==1

***

Q43_FARMINCOME

***

Q43_FARMINCOME: 1= >100000 2=50000-99999; 3=0-49999; 4=LOSS <25000; 5=
LOSS 25000-50000; 6=LOSS>50000
THERE ARE NO OBS ON 6
3 AND 4 ARE CHNAGED TO ONE CATEGORY TO MAKE EQUAL INTERVAL

***
***
***

****************************

*list q43_farmincome if q43_farmincome==6
gen farm_income =1 if q43_farmincome==4 | q43_farmincome==5
replace farm_income =2 if q43_farmincome==3
replace farm_income=3 if q43_farmincome==2
replace farm_income =4 if q43_farmincome==1
*list farm_income q43_farmincome
***

Q43_EDUCATION

***

Q43_EDUC: 1= > H SCHOOL; 2= HIGHSCHOOL; 3=COLLEGE; 4=UNDERGRAD;
5=GRADUATE; 6= VOCATIONAL
THERE IS NO OBSERVATION ON 6

***
***

drop educ
*list q43_educ
gen educ =1 if
replace educ=2
replace educ=3
*list q43_educ

******************************

if q43_educ==6
q43_educ==1 | q43_educ==2
if q43_educ==3 | q43_educ==4
if q43_educ==5
educ

***

Q43_HOUSING
*****************************
*list q43_housing if q43_housing==1

****

Q43_RETIRE
*****************************
*list q43_retire if q43_retire==3

****
***
***

Q43_PLANTOSP
*****************************
Q40_PLANTOSP: 1=NONE; 2=<20000; 3= 20000-50000; 4= >50000
*list q40_plantosp if q40_plantosp==4
gen plantosp=1 if q40_plantosp==1
replace plantosp=2 if q40_plantosp==2
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replace plantosp=3 if q40_plantosp==3
replace plantosp=4 if q40_plantosp==4
*list plantosp if q40_plantosp==4

***
***
***

Q2_BROILERNO
***********************
NUMBER OF BROIER IN 100,000
gen bn=q2_broilerno/100000

***
***
***
***
***
***

***

Q43_PERS ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTIONS ***********
pay = Q43_PERS11-15= GOVT SHOULD PAY FARMERS FOR WATER CONSERVATION
PRACTICES 5=STONGLY AGREEE
Q43_PERS16-20 = GOVT SHULDNOT BE INVOLVED IN AGRICULTURE 5=STONGLY
AGREEE
Q43_PERS21-25 = GOVT INVOLVED IN AG HELPS FARMERS 5=STONGLY AGREEE
Q43_PERS1-5 = LAWS AND REGULATION ARE BALY NEEDED 5=STONGLY AGREEE
Q43_PERS5-10 = WATER CONSERVATION PRACTICES ARE OFTEN CARRIED TOO FAR
5=STONGLY AGREEE
THERE IS ONE OBS WITH GOVT_PAY==6 THAT IS CHAGNED T0 5

egen reg_needed = rowtotal(q43_pers1-q43_pers5)
replace reg_needed =. if reg_needed ==0
egen prog_carried= rowtotal(q43_pers10-q43_pers15)
replace prog_carried=. if prog_carried==0
egen govt_pay = rowtotal(q43_pers11-q43_pers15)
replace govt_pay=5 if govt_pay==6
replace govt_pay =. if govt_pay==0
egen govt_inv=rowtotal(q43_pers16-q43_pers20)
replace govt_inv =. if govt_inv==0
egen govt_ag = rowtotal(q43_pers21-q43_pers25)
replace govt_ag=. if govt_ag==0
***

EDUC * OFFINCOME
**********************
gen offinc_educ=q43_offincome*educ
list q27_d1 q29_maxwtp if q27_d1==. & q29_maxwtp != .
replace q27_d1=1 if q27_d1==. & q29_maxwtp != .

***

SUMMARY STATISTICS

Corr

q27_d1 bn per_own wtp per_littuse q19_litterprodn q30_bmp
q40_plantosp q41_year q43_exper q43_age q43_firmage q43_educ q43_gender
q43_marital q43_offincome q43_spouceincome q43_farmincome q43_assetliab
q43_retire q43_housing q43_worth q43_perstotal q44_contact
q27_d1 broilerno per_own wtp per_littuse q19_litterprodn q30_bmp q39_e
q39_b q39_m q40_plantosp q41_year q42_relative q43_exper q43_age
q43_firmage q43_educ q43_gender q43_marital q43_offincome
q43_spouceincome q43_farmincome q43_assetliab q43_retire q43_housing
q43_worth q43_perstotal q44_contact married married_sincome

sum

****************************
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xi:

xi:

stepwise, pr(.25): ologit q27_d1 bn reg_needed prog_carried per_own
per_littuse q30_bmp q40_plantosp q41_year q43_exper q43_age farm_income
i.educ q43_gender q43_marital q43_offincome q43_spouceincome
q43_assetliab q43_housing q43_worth q43_perstotal q44_contact govt_pay
omodel logit q27_d1 q43_age govt_pay q43_perstotal i.educ per_littuse
q43_offincome i.plantosp

***

ORDERED LOGIT

xi:

sum q27_d1 i.educ q43_offincome q43_age per_littuse q44_contact
reg_needed
tab educ
tab q27_d1

xi:

ologit q27_d1 i.educ q43_offincome q43_age per_littuse q44_contact
reg_needed, robust
mfx, predict(outcome(3))
mfx, predict(outcome(2))
mfx, predict(outcome(1))

xi:

omodel logit q27_d1 i.educ q43_offincome q43_age per_littuse
q44_contact reg_needed
xi:
gologit2 q27_d1 i.educ q43_offincome q43_age per_littuse q44_contact
reg_needed, autofit(0.1) lrforce robust
mfx2
*****
BELOW IS THE ANALYSIS FOR INTERVAL REGRESSION MODELS
gen q27_d1down=0 if q27_d1==1
gen q27_d1up =299 if q27_d1==1
replace q27_d1down=300 if q27_d1==2
replace q27_d1up =499 if q27_d1==2
replace q27_d1down=500 if q27_d1==3
replace q27_d1up =. if q27_d1==3
list q27_d1 q27_d q27_d1down q27_d1up

xi:

intreg q27_d1down q27_d1up i.educ q43_offincome q43_age per_littuse
q44_contact reg_needed, robust
fitstat
predict yhat

sum yhat

149

VITA
Nirmala Adhikari Devkota graduated from the Institute of Agricultural and Animal
Science, Trivuwan University, Nepal, where she received the title of Bachelor of Science in
Agriculture. In January, 1999 she entered graduate school at the University of Western Sydney,
Australia. She obtained the degree of Master of Environmental Management in July, 2000. In the
Spring of 2004, she entered the doctoral program at the Agricultural Economics and
Agribusiness at the Louisiana State University. She obtained the Master of Statistics from
Louisiana State University in August, 2008. She is currently a candidate for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy, which will be awarded in May of 2009.

150

